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LETTER TO PROFESSOR ARTHUR D. NOCK ON SOME FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS IN THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

MARTIN P. NILSSON
LUND UNIVERSITY

PREFATORY NOTE. This letter has a lengthy history. More than thirty years ago I felt the necessity of a knowledge of and clearing up of the modes and lines of thought of unlettered people and wrote down a draft of a lecture upon which I have drawn here. Later on I applied my views to a special field, the concept, or to speak more justly the concepts of the soul, in a lecture delivered to the Fifth Congress for the History of Religions at Lund in 1929. Then I put the subject aside, although it always lurked at the back of my mind. Certain recent tendencies in the science of religion caused me to reconsider the problems involved and to write down a draft in order to coördinate and to systematize my views in regard to certain fundamental questions of this science. I happened to mention this in a letter to Professor Nock, and, as he wanted to take cognizance of the draft I had made for private purposes, I translated it into English and sent it to him. When he wished to publish it I asked him to subject my draft to the judgment of an expert anthropologist and to let me know his opinion. Professor Kluckhohn of Harvard was kind enough to read my manuscript and to supply some useful remarks and references. As he found my considerations useful, I consented to their being printed. I thank these two colleagues warmly for the interest they have taken in them. I am under a heavy debt of gratitude to Mrs. W. L. Sperry for her kindness in undertaking the difficult task of revising my English style in this paper as well as in others which I have published in the Harvard Theological Review.

Lund, May 15, 1947

MY DEAR NOCK:

I wrote down these considerations, not for publication but for myself, in order to clear up matters, to test old ideas and new opinions and to coördinate them. But as you take an interest in

them I send them to you for your own edification and, I hope, as an occasion for a stimulating correspondence. In my early days I was intensely interested in primitive religion and anthropology and I wrote a book on primitive religion and another on primitive culture (in Swedish), but in the early twenties I began my extensive work in Greek Religion; (my book on Homer and Mycenae belongs also to this series, for the study of religion drove me to try to fill up the gap between the prehistoric and the historical age of Greece). Thus my reading of anthropological literature has necessarily been limited. Of the work of recent authorities, Pater Schmidt, Malinowski, etc., I know but the outlines. My age would prevent me from a long and exhaustive study, but certain new tendencies among the young scholars of the science of religion in my country have made me reconsider my views.

These young scholars would imply that, in the light of more recent research, the work of an older generation is fit only for the wastepaper basket, but this is not true. The putting of the questions, the results achieved, the terminology of an older generation are more enduring than a younger generation is willing to admit. The battle against evolutionism is in part a tilting against windmills. There is always a development, always an evolution. That it is lacking among primitive peoples is an illusion due to the fact that we know but a brief space of their existence. Evolution may go in either direction to higher or lower forms, the latter is called degeneration. Take for example Gnosticism which began as a kind of philosophy with a strain of myth and ended in gross mythology and magic. Higher or lower is a value-judgment, subjective, the outcome of the individual's own personal viewpoint (which is itself not necessarily devoid of logic). On the whole evolution goes from what are, in regard to formalities and concepts, more elementary forms to purer and more complicated forms, just as material evolution does.[1] It would be strange if spiritual and religious evolution did not show any progress; after all, material evolution and techniques do so. The anti-evolutionists cannot deny evolution in religions which are known historically without falsifying facts. Perhaps only W. F. Otto does

[1] Cf. my review of W. F. Otto, Dionysos, in the German periodical Gnomon, xi. 1935, pp. 177 et seqq.

that — but the religion which he finds, e.g., in Nonnos is not that which was alive in the age of Nonnos. There may be the seeds of growth, e.g., a mythical clothing of concepts among the earlier Gnostics, but these need to be developed, to be actualized, in order to be of importance. Thus, the range of the anti-evolutionists is that of primitive religions, the religions of the peoples concerning whose history information is lacking.

Anti-evolutionism would, however, not have taken so strong a hold, if it did not have some justification. Let us look at the common series: power, taboo, magic, daemons, gods, religion. It is very often taken to be an evolutional series: preanimism, dynamism, animatism, animism, polydaemonism, polytheism, monotheism; that is, it is thought to be an historical evolution.

I have long been opposed to this taking of one thing for another, to this taking a logical for an historical series, but I think I should still be called an evolutionist. For I acknowledge the logical series, going from lower to higher ideas, but as conceptual, not as historical. The mentioned ideas are found in various stages, in germ perhaps in all stages of the historical evolution. The anti-evolutionist paints the devil black indeed in order to be able to chastise him the better. In the first edition of my Primitive Religion (1911) the first chapter in which these ideas were treated bears the title, "Fundamental Psychological Ideas," and as time went on, the difference between the conceptual, logical series and actual development has become still clearer to me. I may only refer to what I say in my Gesch. d. gr. Rel. I p. 34 et seq.

Es muss schon von vorneherein Verwahrung eingelegt werden gegen Missbräuche, die nicht selten mit der vergleichenden Religionswissenschaft getrieben werden und geeignet sind, sie in Verruf zu bringen. Die vergleichende Erforschung der primitiven Religionen baut nicht wie die vergleichende Mythologie auf einer gemeinsamen Abstammung der Mythen, der Religion und der Sprachen auf sondern auf der Annahme einer gemeinsamen psychischen Veranlagung der ganzen Menschheit. Diese Annahme ist zwar nicht unbestritten, hat aber eine so feste Grundlage in den Tatsachen, dass man vergeblich sucht, sich ihr zu entziehen. Tabugebote und Reinigungsriten, Seelenglaube u.s.w. sind allgemein menschlich. Diese Grundvoraussetzung ist jedoch nur bezüglich der einfachen Hauptelemente gesichert; sobald es zu kom-

plexeren Gebilden kommt, ist sie nicht mehr gültig. Es ist unberechtigt, Erscheinungen wie den Totemismus, auch wenn sie bei primitiven Völkern sehr verbreitet sind, als allgemein gültig hinzustellen. Vorschnelle Verallgemeinerungen, welche dieser Wissenschaft besonders geschädigt haben, müssen vermieden werden. Ähnlich verhält es sich, wenn Besonderheiten in einer oder mehreren primitiven Religionen dazu verwendet werden, um besondere Erscheinungen in der griechischen Religion zu erklären; im Spezialfall versagt die Methode, weil sie nicht darlegen kann, wie es einmal in einem bestimmten geschichtlichen Fall gewesen ist, sondern nur das Verständnis im allgemeinen fördern und klären kann. Es sollte nie vergessen werden, dass sie mit einem Zusammanhang arbeitet, der nicht geschichtlich, sondern psychologisch ist.

Damit hängt eine andere irrige Auffassung zusammen, die oft begegnet, aber mehr die primitive Religionswissenschaft als solche angeht. Diese Disziplin heisst 'Wissenschaft', nicht 'Geschichte' der primitiven Religionen, denn sie stellt die strukturelle Verwandtschaft der Religionen, nicht ihren geschichtlichen Zusammenhang oder ihre tatsächliche Entwicklung dar, wofür nicht einmal das Material vorhanden ist. Wenn sie eine Reihenfolge gewisser Begriffe aufstellt, z. B. die Macht, die Mächte, Geisterwesen und Götter, oder den Glauben an den wiederkehrenden Toten und an die Seele, so handelt es sich dabei um ein logisches Nacheinander; dieses wird aber oft mit einer geschichtlichen Aufeinanderfolge verwechselt und man stellt die Sache so hin, als sei der Glaube an die Macht älter als der Glaube an machterfüllte Wesen. Auf diese Weise wird das logische Nacheinander mit dem geschichtlichen, tatsächlichen verwechselt. In Wirklichkeit wissen wir z. B. nicht, welche von den beiden erwähnten Vorstellungen zuerst in einem Menschen aufdämmerte, oder ob sie beide uranfänglich sind; solange wir die Religionen kennen, gehen sie neben einander her.

I think this is what is needed. My views were greatly determined by my experience during a fairly extensive work with anthropological materials when I wrote my book on Primitive Time-Reckoning. In this field conditions are fairly simple, some simple facts are the basis. The simplest ideas are the same everywhere: determining the time of the day by the position of the sun, the time of the year by the change of the seasons, the rising of the stars, the phases of the moon and their connection with the seasons, the naming of years from events. Evolution varies and is different in certain parts of the world, these do not agree with

the *Kulturkreise*. Survivals of primitive time-reckoning are found among all civilized peoples.

Associations: More than thirty years ago I asked for something which I called *eine primitive Erkenntnisslehre*. What I had in mind will appear from the following. This desire seemed to be met by a large work of Lévy-Bruhl, La mentalité primitive, but it is not satisfactory. L-B was hampered by his desire *à tout prix* to say something absolutely new. He is criticized and rightly. My opinion is expressed in the introduction to the French translation of my paper on soul-concepts.[2]

The faculty of thought in primitive man does not differ essentially from that of civilized man, but I cannot agree with the opinion of certain anthropologists that they are absolutely identical; a development from lower to higher forms has taken place. The beginning is the same, but there is a difference like that between the jingling of a musical child and the playing of a virtuoso. Like everything the faculty of thought can and must be exercised and trained, let us say developed. This is the difference. I should say with you that primitive (you say prelogical) mentality is a fairly good description of the mental behavior of most people today except in their technical or consciously intellectual activities.

The materials with which the faculty of thought works are supplied by associations. I avoid the common expression 'association of ideas' because the word 'idea' seems to imply something reasonable, but the associations may be as arbitrary and nonlogical as possible. Moreover one of the members is often not an idea but a sense perception (see below). Associations are of central importance for the understanding of primitive mentality and I must dwell upon them, not only with regard to the mentality of savage and barbarous peoples, but also with regard to the like mentality among civilized people (see your dictum). I am not competent and I do not wish to say anything about the philosophical discussion concerning the association of ideas, I take them empirically. The importance which I ascribe to them does not commit me either way as to the assertion that consciousness comes

[2] Revue de l'Histoire et de la Philosophie religieuses, x. 1930, pp. 113 et seqq.

into being through mental chemistry, nor concerning the great problem of the *Gestaltpsychologie*.

Here something of great importance must be pointed out. Civilized people think chiefly in words, primitive people in imagery. Language is the instrument of thought and some knowledge of primitive languages, of their vocabulary as well as of their grammar, is helpful to understand the modes and lines of thought of primitive peoples. Primitive languages are very concrete and poor in abstract expressions. This is not to be confused with any lack of general representations. I come back to this later on.

An association is a coupling of two components. One which calls forth the association can be a sense perception or a representation in mind, the other which is coupled with the former is a representation in mind or a remembrance. A representation may rise to the level of consciousness without calling forth an association. Many years ago the name Kirsopp Lake came into my mind and I began to cast about in my mind as to whether it meant a man or a lake. Much later I learned that it was the name of a very well known scholar. We shall see that this is of certain importance in regard to the associations. More commonly a representation is called forth through a sense perception or another representation which is coupled with it. It is superfluous to dwell upon this, but it should be noted that the sense perception or representation which calls forth the association may be subconscious. One evening I had laid aside the papers on my writing desk and was staring unthinkingly at the blotting paper, beside which there was a calendar of the month. Suddenly I was astonished to find that Professor Wrangel came into my mind. After a while I glanced at the calendar and behold the name Evert — the Christian name of Professor Wrangel. Associations may be as fortuitous and arbitrary as possible and this is the reason why I do not like to add 'of ideas.' Another example throws light on a point which, moreover, is very important in my opinion, the tendency of an association to be repeated and fixed. Long ago when bicycling on a bit of road over which I often go in the summer, a Dutch friend came into my mind. This happened the next time I went over this piece of road and soon I could not go

there without thinking of van Hille. Later on, when I came there once with a son of mine I told him this. He asked: Do you think of van Hille when you go in the opposite direction too? I did not then but ever since that day I do think of him.

Modern philosophers criticize Plato's two categories of associations, similarity and contiguity, i.e., nearness in space or time. Association by contrast can, though with a certain difficulty, be subordinated to these two categories. Philosophers speak of association through interest. This may be tested. I begin with a time-honored example. In a place in New Guinea where a missionary lived, an unknown disease broke out which proved devastating as so often happens when a new disease appears among a savage people. The natives imputed it first to a sheep, an animal unknown to them, which the missionary had brought with him, and compelled him to kill it. As the disease did not abate, the natives imputed its continuance to a portrait of Queen Victoria in the missionary's study. The reason why the natives coupled these things with the disease was that they were something new, something unknown to them. To us it seems unreasonable, but the natives acted just as a scientist does who tries to find out the cause of a new phenomenon, he casts about for a new circumstance which may be the cause of it. Under ordinary circumstances, they would have cared neither for the sheep nor the portrait, but the interest, the tension caused by the epidemic, made them cast about for a cause and called forth the association. Professor von Sydow has written a paper on the importance of the unusual in belief and custom.[3] He wants to present a new category of associations of ideas which he names phantasy or emotional associations because, he says, there is nothing in itself which leads thought from the one when the other appears. This is correct, but I have stated already that an association can be as fortuitous as it is thinkable. If your mind is intensely occupied with something, it is enough that some other thing should appear, i.e., nearness in space or time, to evoke an association. I take an example of von Sydow's, the pillar pine (a very unusual and remarkable form of the pine tree) at the root of which coins were

[3] In the Swedish periodical 'Folkminnen och Folktankar,' xiii. 1926, pp. 53 et seqq.

laid by the sick. When anyone was sick the very striking appearance of this tree produced an association with the disease, especially when we take into consideration the known rôle of trees and plants in popular medicine. Others of his examples are quite analogous with that adduced from New Guinea. Interest forms no new category of associations. To use a comparison from chemistry, it serves as a catalyst which calls forth a process which would otherwise not have appeared. You may also compare it with the technique of electricity and say that interest is the tension the increase of which causes the spark to pass from one pole to another. It is absolutely necessary to have a clear conception of the fortuitousness and arbitrariness of associations, because they are foreign to our logical methods of thought. I shall return to this difference.

There is another, little observed form of association which has a certain similarity with the last mentioned, a willed, purposeful association. If you want a Latin term, I may call it a voluntative association. You make a knot in your handkerchief in order to remember something. In Peru this was developed in the *quipu*. Such aids to the memory are common among primitive peoples. The Pima of Arizona make use of a tally. The year-mark is a deep notch across the stick. The records of early years are memorized, and there are a few minor notches to aid in recalling them. The year-notches are all alike, yet when a narrator is asked to recount the years, he never makes a mistake. Taking the stick in his hand, he would rake his thumb-nail across a year-notch and begin: This notch means that, etc. More on this is to be found in my Primitiv kultur, pp. 197 et seqq., where I pointed to the importance also of such arbitrary associations for primitive art which interprets geometrical patterns as animals and objects. It is enough for a primitive man to have a certain animal in his mind when drawing a line or two or cutting a notch to connect these with a certain animal. Through repetition the associations of a geometrical design with a certain animal or object can be fixed. Similarly primitive people find men, animals, and objects in the constellations.

I fear that your psychologist may accuse me of a superannuated associationist psychology. To this I reply as follows: I speak

solely of the origin of ideas. An idea arises by necessity in a single brain and vanishes with this, if it is not accepted by others. The mode of life, the lines of thought, the interests of a group of men may be so much akin that the same idea is likely to arise in the minds of several men. The same circumstances may cause an idea, proffered by an individual, to be readily accepted by his fellows. This conditions the living on of an idea, i.e., the social group is the necessary condition. An idea is formed and fixed by the social group, and this group is the bearer of the tradition by which an idea lives on. It may also modify the ideas and add new ideas. Thus, social psychology is of paramount importance.

It has been objected that associationist psychology refers only to single elements of complex ideas. This is not true. If I see an object belonging to a certain man, this may recall the whole man, his shape, his manners, his actions, etc. To take an extreme instance, the anecdote that Newton seeing an apple falling from a tree hit upon the law of gravitation: The falling apple is a complex idea, the other component is much more complex, the whole universe. Or, take the example of the sheep and the plague. The sheep is a complex idea and the plague and its consequences also.

I may be reproached for generalizing too much, and thought to "make the 'primitive' into a kind of fictitious absolute category," as says Professor Kluckhohn. To this objection I reply: my purpose is to analyze a certain mode of 'thought' which is at the bottom of the minds of unlettered people (savages, barbarians, or peasants of a bygone age), and of which traces are found frequently even in educated people of today. I adduce examples from my own experience too. I am fully aware of the variability of the culture of primitive peoples, of the fact that the elements discussed here are developed differently in different peoples. Some hints to this fact will be given in the course of this letter. But after all, there is a common background and my aim was to find out this common background of undeveloped human thought.

Property: Before I enter upon the subject which has evoked these considerations, religion, I want to call attention to another region where the importance of associations is especially evident, ideas of the rights of property and their origin among primitive peoples. My son Per commented briefly on this in a juristic

dissertation,[4] but it would be worth while to subject this theme to thorough research. The idea of the right of property has its origin in an association of a certain person or certain persons with a certain object, and the more intimate this association is, the stronger is the idea of the right of property. It concerns everywhere in the first line personal belongings which a man always wears and which therefore are associated with him most intimately: clothes, weapons, jewelry, etc. This explains a fact which surprised some modern scholars, namely, that primitive people know that literary property, that is to say, songs, magical formulas and so forth, belong to the man who uses them and others may not use them without his consent. In my Primitiv kultur, pp. 157 et seqq., where there are further examples, following other scholars, I emphasized the importance of labor for the origin of property, but fundamentally this, too, is an association, the product is associated with the maker, the thing cultivated with the cultivator. So, pots are the property of women as long as pot-making is an industry of women. It need not be said that the owner can transfer his property to another, a garment, a weapon, a pot, a magic formula, etc., in exchange or for payment, thereby annulling the association of the object with himself. Association can be weakened or annulled if the owner does not use an object. I cannot here enlarge upon the consequences of this view as concerning the important idea of the ownership of land or of inheritance, but I may point to a curious fact which is explained by this view, namely, that a fruit bearing tree may belong to the person who planted it, even if the ground is not his

[4] Per Nilsson-Stjernquist, Om handräckningsutslag, Lund 1946, pp. 38 et seqq. I translate some relevant sentences. Among primitive peoples substantives are wanting that correspond to the words *dominium* and *possessio*, right of property or possession. However, genitives or corresponding forms are found everywhere. A person and an object are connected, e.g., by one of them being put in the genitive. The Greenland Eskimoes are cited as an example. According to Professor W. Thalbitzer they lack an abstract concept of the right of property. One observes solely that they conceive of the connection of a person with an object much more intimately than we do. One might say that all possessed objects have a very great affection value for the possessor himself as well as for others. For others the object so to say takes color through its connection with a certain person. Because of this, stealing is a bad action. The affection value of a harpoon which once belonged to a skilled hunter is in a certain measure comparable. The value is inherent in the harpoon even though for a long time it has been used by others. Ceremonies in bargaining or exchange of goods do not occur. This record is very illuminating.

property. I have myself experienced how tenacious this idea is. Near my summer home was a garden in which a shrub of German elder grew. The birds carried seeds to my land where a few shrubs of this kind grew up. On one occasion the old woman who owned the garden explained to me that these shrubs in reality were her property because the seeds had come from her garden. You have added an exactly similar example from Ireland. A neighbor of Mrs. Sperry's sister claimed that the tiny cyclamens that prospered so on the rockery came from her garden and that the raspberry canes were hers because they seeded themselves from hers. If an object, e.g., a boat, is made by the common labor of several persons, it is associated with all of them, it is common property. This point of view is especially notable in regard to landed property; in certain cases it applies to cultivated ground, but here there are various modifications in regard to hunting and grazing lands which appear clearly to belong to a certain tribe or group. On the other hand implements such as traps and bow-weels, placed on the common ground, are the property of an individual, for they are associated with him. The importance of association appears in regard to heredity too. Generally the heirs have helped the man from whom they inherit in his work, at least the heirs are associated with the man from whom they inherit, the association is, so to speak, contagious. In this letter it is possible only to call attention to some simple fundamental facts, not to enlarge upon the modifications which took place as conditions became modified and complicated and when fixed customs were added. It is a subject which ought to be followed up.

Elaboration of associations: Something more must be said on two points. One is the elaboration of the materials given by associations, through logic and experience. Logic is not wholly wanting among primitive peoples, but it is embryonic, undeveloped; experience is of greater importance. Two issues emphasize the necessity for developing the idea of the elaboration of associations. One is causality which Frazer emphasized when speaking of magic and which is vigorously contested by scholars. I shall come back to this later. I do not wish to discuss the philosophical problem as to whether causality is given *a priori* or whether Hume's dictum is right: "causation is known as an habitual antecedence

and as a tendency on our part to look for something definite to come. Apart from this practical meaning it has no significance whatever." The tendency to find a cause, to seek for an explanation is innate in man; a testimony is the aetiological myth. I dare say that even animals instinctively know something of cause and effect. If a horse on a warm day takes refuge in the shadow of a tree, it is because it is cooler there. As a matter of fact, the idea of causality arises from an observed sequence of happenings in time. As Hume says, A is followed by B; if A happens, one expects that B also will happen. Because of the lack of logic in associations, this *post hoc* may be taken as a *propter hoc*, a mistaken conclusion which is still common. An Australian tribe carries big leaves as umbrellas when it rains and they hear the frogs chant. When they wish for rain during a drought, they carry those umbrellas and imitate the chanting of the frogs. Here is an association of two components, A and B, and the Australian expects, that if one happens, the other will happen too. Experience alone teaches that an association conditioned by causality cannot be reversed; it goes from A to B, but not from B to A. Such an association can, however, be fixed. This is important for magic (see below). An action may be repeated and if the wished for consequence happens fortuitously, belief is strengthened; failure is overlooked. This is still common, or quacks would not have so many followers.

The second question is the *punctum saliens* in Lévy-Bruhl, that is his contention that to the primitive mind the part is identical with the whole. A feather *is* a bird. A man who carries a feather of an eagle on his head *is* an eagle. Here language must be taken into account. The copula *is*, which must necessarily be added in our languages, implies to us identity or subsumption: in the latter case the subject is part of a larger group of similar objects, e.g., he is a man. In earlier languages the copula *is* is often lacking and it is probably lacking in primitive languages. But my knowledge of them is too restricted to warrant a general judgment. I can only presume that the copula may be wanting. In this case two words are put at the side of each other, they are stood up against one another, there is a relation between them, but the quality of this relationship is not expressed. Lévy-Bruhl is guilty

of an error, according to our linguistic use in interpolating the copula *is* and concluding from this that the relationship is that of an identity. Association on the ground of similarity can be used for a mistaken conclusion: *simile, ergo idem.* In this case too the associations are purged through experience and logic. The working up and purging of the associations is a long enduring process which is not ended as yet, but modern man, especially scientists, have or ought to have advanced a bit through training. This is the difference between the mentality of primitive and civilized man, the former may belong to a savage people or to a cultured people.

General ideas (*Categories*): The second point which I hinted at above is closely related to associations, which are fundamental for my views. It is the general ideas and the two form the basis of a chapter in my book on primitive culture, pp. 97 et seqq. Here too I am not competent or willing to discuss the philosophical problems, I simply state their existence. I begin with those which I did not touch upon loc. cit. The words for 'man,' 'woman,' 'warrior,' etc., are general ideas and they are probably present in all languages, but primitive languages are relatively poor in regard to such words. It has often been emphasized how much concreteness and wealth of details the representations or ideas of primitive peoples imply. They are very complex. There is a corresponding scarcity of words expressing general ideas. Thus, there may be many words signifying different species of trees or fish but no generic word for 'tree' or 'fish.' Such a general idea may be said to be a bundle of associations, individuals being associated on the ground of their similarity. Designations of quality come next to these. There is no language but can express such qualities as 'big,' 'old,' 'weak,' 'strong,' 'dark,' but we must free ourselves from the idea, founded on our grammar, that they are necessarily expressed by adjectives. There are other possibilities. One means is the reduplication which is found in many languages, and with children too. Its basis is emotional.

Next we proceed to that expression for general ideas which I treated loc. cit. and called categories. The reduplication may, e.g., in Greek, serve as a grammatical category. Such categories are developed abundantly in many languages, and more, e.g., in

certain Indian and Bantu languages than in Indo-European languages. Everywhere these categories show a like power of laying hold on the whole language regardless of actual connection, e.g. gender in the Indo-European languages; all words are incorporated in a gender-category, frequently in contrast to their real gender, even if in fact they have nothing at all to do with sex. Our word classes are actual as well as grammatical categories, but categories exist which are not expressed by linguistic forms, and the means of expression differ, see my remarks on the expression of qualities.[5] In this case a category may be called a classification. Loc. cit., p. 135. I advanced the hypothesis that totemism is such a classification which was not carried through. Two examples: It is told of the Wakallura and related tribes in North Queensland that everything, dead or living, is divided between the two exogamous halves in which the tribes are divided. The Zunis divide all things in the world among the seven regions which correspond to the places of the clans in their camp. Classifications seem to be instinctive and appear, especially in language, as categories which cover the whole material of the language and extend even to material which is not pertinent. The result is that general ideas exist, but unconsciously, for primitive languages have not the abstract substantives which we use. They recognize no grammatical rules but they have such and apply them without exception. Classification is a strand of the same fabric, even if it is not expressed in words. General ideas exist but appear consciously only in the particular cases. Here I ought to work in the chapter on primitive mentality from my book on primitive culture, but I dare to hope that the above lines will give a sufficient idea of my thoughts.

Soul-representations: I now turn to the subject which has called forth these considerations, namely religion, and I shall begin with the images of the soul, because the dominant importance of the associations is especially evident in such images.

If we wish to think of a deceased person who was dear to us,

[5] Professor Kluckhohn refers to H. G. Alexander, Linguistic Morphology in relation to Thinking, Journal of Philosophy, xxxiii, 1936, pp. 261 et seqq. His statement, p. 267, that morphology comes nearer to a natural and primitive systematization of the world than does vocabulary, agrees substantially with my view on the so-called categories.

we customarily turn to his grave, and we speak of the grave as his last resting place, his house, although we know well that his personality, his soul, is not there. I knew a mother who had lost a little child and who, in winter, used to cover its grave with fir-tree boughs, so that, she said, 'the little one might be warm.' The last thoughts which are associated with the dead lead us to those places where their bodily remains have been laid. Such is our experience, and we cannot but expect primitive peoples to have given themselves over even less critically to the influence of associations, without considering whether these were consistent or agreed with one another.

From the earlier palaeolithic period the dead man was laid on a bed of small stones holding a hand axe, which was both weapon and tool. Later, but still in that same distant period, food, weapons, ornaments, or colors for painting the body, were placed with him. These things are called 'grave gifts' or 'sacrificial gifts' and are supposed to have been meant to serve the dead as nourishment or equipment. This is the customary, rationalistic explanation; as a matter of fact it is just a matter of associations. The need of nourishment and weapons, fondness for ornament, were associated with the living, and these associations perpetuated themselves in relation to the dead and occasioned the giving of nourishment, weapons and ornaments.

This extension to the dead of the associations formerly connected with the living — or, more correctly, the failure to sever these associations from the dead — goes, however, very much further. That which is peculiar to the living, in contradistinction to the dead, is self-mobility. It is well known that this also was often attributed to the dead, an idea which still survives in the belief in ghosts. Either the dead man himself or his bodily remains, his skeleton, is thought to move about.

On the other hand the dead man was even, in palaeolithic times, buried in the earth, i.e., treated in a different fashion than were the living. This means that people were aware that he was dead, i.e., that the associations connected with the living were no longer applicable to him. People knew, therefore, that the dead man was dead, and treated him accordingly. Above all, it was known that he had lost self-mobility. These two lines of association flatly

contradict each other, yet run side by side down to the present day. This is characteristic of the double nature of the relationship — the ambivalence of the feeling mentioned above.

If it was known that the dead man was dead, that meant that the associations connected with him as living had to be severed or cut away from him as dead, and this held, above all, for self-mobility, which was the real distinguishing mark of the living. It is not easy — above all, for the primitive it is quite as impossible — to conceive that self-mobility has simply gone to nothing, as, that the world was created out of nothing, or, indeed, that death is something natural. Self-mobility was naturally conceived of, not as an abstract characteristic, but in its manifestations, as something concrete. Therefore in death it separated itself from the dead man and went on existing somewhere else. That was a matter of observation. It flew up into the sky with the last breath, it flowed away with the blood which streamed from the wound, for, when the blood-stream or the breath ceased, death appeared.

Through these associations the soul is identified with life. German scholars have coined the word *Lebensseele*. As life is associated with various parts of the body, the soul may be found in the breath, in the blood, in the entrails, etc., and consequently German scholars speak of *Hauchseele*, *Blutseele*, and generally of *Körperseelen*.

However, it is not necessary to look for the vanishing self-mobility in some part of the man's body, or, generally, in something belonging to him; it can legitimately be associated with something outside the man, provided only that it be in such close contact with him as to provide a route for the association. An excellent example of this is provided by the so-called Fanany cult, which is very widespread. The first worm which wiggles out of the disintegrating corpse is protected and given special care, being taken, as it were, for a representative of the dead man. It is something living which has come forth out of the dead man. In a similar way the same association may be attached to any living thing which settles on the corpse or comes near it — an insect, a butterfly, a bird, a snake which crawls out of the grave. These are the 'soul-animals' (*Seelentiere*), called by many names, which have acquired their significance in exactly the same way as, for

example, the *Hauchseele*, i.e., through an association which transferred the self-mobility or the life of the dead man to some external object which in one way or another came into contact with him.

But the possibilities of association are far from being exhausted with these examples. I may further refer to some well-known instances: the soul may be identified with the shadow, the image and even the name. A man's shadow accompanies him everywhere where the sun is shining, has the same outline as he, makes the same motions, in short, is most closely connected with him. No wonder, then, that the shadow is treated as the man's *alter ego* and that the same associations are attached to it as to the man. It is perfectly reasonable then that the shadow is considered as a sort of soul.

The same is true for the portrait, though an actual, individual portrait is so rare among primitives that the 'portrait-soul' never attained full development, the associations attached thereto were not firmly established and therefore have an earlier, looser form. Primitives are notoriously opposed to photography. For the camera, in fact, provides a completely similar portrait, to which are attached the same associations as those connected with the man photographed. This portrait, however, is in the possession of some other person, and the man photographed does not know what may be done with it. He is not master of his *alter ego*. No wonder, then, that he opposes the taking of a picture.

The name is seldom identified with the soul — the word *Namensseele* is rare — but the name can just as well be considered a soul as can the shadow or the picture. A man's name is a point in which all sorts of associations are bound up, but is, however, invisible. If the name be pronounced, the same associations are called up as those attached to the possessor. Herein lies the well-known significance or power of the name, which equals or, indeed, exceeds the significance of any given part of the body, e.g., the hair, etc. That the name is not customarily reckoned among things which are considered souls is because in this instance the associations are not, as otherwise, attached to something visible.

If the word soul be taken in this sense I should not hesitate to identify the soul also with the tomb monument. For the monu-

ment sometimes appears as the representative of the dead man, and this not, as a matter of fact, because his soul is thought to have taken up residence in it, but because the associations which belong to the one who lies beneath it have been transferred to the monument.[6] In the Greek cult of heroes it sometimes happened that the monument was washed, anointed, or even kissed. And so with this went the fact that the simple, elongated gravestone was developed into a portrait of the dead man, whether only in the form of a herm, with head and genitals, or in that of a representation incised on the vertical surface of the stone. (This is still clearer with the Aramaeans, where the grave stone was in fact called *nefesch*, soul.) And so ultimately we come to the grave-statue. Because of the associations deriving from the dead man it is only natural that the tomb monument should be invested with his features.

Various scholars have correctly emphasized the great and fundamental difference between the notion of the soul of a dead man and that of the soul of a living one. This distinction holds also for us today. The popular notion of the human soul as a man's spiritual personality, detached from all bodily attributes, holds, as a matter of fact, only for the living man. As soon as we attempt to imagine the soul of a dead person, we begin to conceive of it as a sort of ghost. Evidences of this are the appearances of ghosts in spiritualistic séances and the theories about materialization and the astral body, which are only make-shift devices for bridging the gap between these two irreconcilable concepts of the soul.

This distinction is natural, indeed necessary, if the notions of the soul are to be treated from the point of view here laid down. According to our popular notion of it, the soul works through the organs of the body, and these are in consequence simply disregarded, a fact which constitutes our real advance over the primitive notion by which the soul was attached to the body. In both instances the living body is the point of association.

Those same associations which are attached to the living car

[6] Cf. B. Schweitzer, Studien zur Entstehung des Porträts bei den Griechen, Akademie der Wiss., Leipzig, Berichte, phil.-hist. Klasse, xci, 1939, fasc. 4, pp. 1 et seqq.

be carried over to the dead. What then arises is no concept of the soul, but a belief in ghosts, a notion of the *revenant* of the living corpse. If the dead man is to be conceived of as dead, as not living, then it necessarily follows that the associations attached to the living are torn loose and cut away from their point of association. Nevertheless they continue to exist, and have become homeless and seek a new dwelling. This simile is not completely false, but it would doubtless be more nearly correct to say that if a new point of association be provided they likewise attach themselves to it.

To indicate where such a point is to be found I need mention only the common concept of the soul, which Germans call *Freiseele*, classical scholars *psyche*. It is this *Bildseele*, appearing in dreams and in hallucinations, which is the most important point of connection, although I incline to favor that view which attributes great importance to the picture preserved in memory. The so-called *Freiseele* is a *Bildseele*, except for the fact that the image is nothing actually present or visible, but is an image preserved in memory or seen in dreams and therefore capable of assuming all those associations which attached themselves to the living man. This it does down to the last detail, so comprehensively, indeed, that this concept of the soul as a spirit approximates the belief in ghosts to such a degree, that the two are almost fused. On the other hand, the *Freiseele*, since it is not an actually visible image, is somewhat vague, and is influenced by other concepts of the soul, sometimes even to the point of fusion with them, e.g., with the breath-soul, the animal-soul, etc.

A real concept of the soul is missing among the primitives — and also at much higher levels of culture. What exists is a "bundle of associations" which attach themselves to a given point and are thereby made definite, although in actuality loose and kaleidoscopic.

Moreover, there exists no single "bundle of associations," but a large number of such "bundles," as there is a large number of points of departure. Pluralistic teaching about the soul is founded in the nature of things, and only our habits of thought make it surprising that man should have several 'souls.' For the bundles of associations exist side by side, without being tested for relation-

ship, agreement or disagreement. Such testing is only a very late development.

Of course, they influence and color one another. For example, the *Freiseele* or the animal-soul is also attributed to living men. More important in this connection than such mutual influence is the fact that, as always happens, the bundles of associations, through repetition and tradition, become fixed, and as it were ossify and petrify. After they have attained a certain fixity, they can be called concepts. The ossification consists in the fact that the fixed concept, disengaged from its point of departure, is treated as an independent and complete entity. Thus, for instance, in the story about the man who sold his shadow to the devil, the shadow is taken from the man. The so-called 'external soul' is a good example of this disengagement and petrification.

In conclusion I wish to add one point more. The word 'soul-material' (*Seelenstoff*), introduced by scholars who have been occupied with the study of the Indonesian peoples, has been very much used and applied by transference to the concepts of other peoples, e.g., the North-American Indians. 'Soul-stuff' is a sort of substance with certain capacities normally attributed to the soul, which permeates not only men but the whole surrounding world. It belongs in the same category as *mana*. The question is, therefore, not of the *Freiseele*, but of life-energy, although beliefs are found in which the two concepts are confused. This life-energy is associated with all living creatures and therefore constitutes a general concept of a 'soul-stuff' permeating everything which, however, influences and is influenced by the customary notions of the soul.

Power (*Mana*): In regard to "concepts" of the soul, associations are dominant, a general idea comes in only with the 'soul-stuff,' which is a border-line case, the latter dominates in a fundamental and much-argued problem, the problem of the *mana*, or, to speak more generally, the "representation" of power, the idea of power, which often, though erroneously, is spoken of as a concept. This idea was emphasized about thirty years ago by some scholars, of whom Marett was one, and in opposition to Tylor's animism it was taken to be the basis of religion. Accordingly this doctrine was called preanimism. In Germany it was called

animatism, an incorrect term, because this word has another significance to which I shall refer later. The best designation is the word 'dynamism' which goes straight to the core. Some German scholars say orendism, borrowing a word from Indians in North America. In the beginning power was conceived of rather mechanically, later it seems, it was qualified, so that religion colored it, using the contrast of magic and religion, to which I shall refer later. This was especially the view of R. Otto; power became *mysterium tremendum*, *fascinosum*, *numinosum*, somewhat like the English word 'awe' which implies reverence as well as fear. Thus the idea of reverence was added which religion needs but which is absent in magic, i.e., the holy. On the other hand, one comes pretty near the ancient hypothesis that religion is founded on and has arisen from fear.

The idea, or to speak more justly, the concept of power is vigorously criticized nowadays. It is said that the faculty of thought of primitive peoples is too undeveloped to conceive such a concept, and that power emanates always from a person or a spirit, but it is seldom mentioned that there are also examples of power coming from things, not from persons or spirits. This criticism is due to misunderstanding. Long ago I pointed out the fact that power appears to consciousness only in separate phenomena or cases, one cannot speak of a concept of power. Two things have contributed to lead the discussion astray. The first is that the word by which power is usually designated, *mana*, is borrowed from a people and a language, in which the idea of power has undergone a special development, further, that *mana*, like power, in our language is an abstract substantive. It would be better and more correct to designate power by an adjective, for power is a quality such as 'big,' 'strong,' 'weak,' 'old,' etc., which even primitive languages can express. The Dakota word *wakanda*, translated as 'Great Spirit,' means simply 'mystery' or 'mysterious' and signifies a quality rather than a definite entity. Among many tribes the sun is *wakanda*, among the same tribes the moon is *wakanda*, and so are thunder, lightning, the stars, the winds, various animals, trees, and inanimate objects or places of a striking character: even a man, especially a medicine man, may be considered as *wakanda*.[7]

[7] R. Karsten, The Origin of Religion, p. 191, with references.

This quality has been said to be supernatural, but it has been justly remarked that to primitive peoples there is no difference between that which depends on natural causes and that which depends on supernatural causes, such as there is to us. They do not realize that that which depends on supernatural causes is not explainable according to natural causes, but they have a sense of order, of what is to be expected to happen, a sense which is absolutely necessary for the simplest practical ends, for life. Thus, one may use the word 'supernormal,' for all feel the difference between the usual and the unusual. If one clearly understands that power is an unconscious general idea of the same kind as those ideas which we express through adjectives such as 'big,' etc., the objections already noted appear to be without value, depending on misunderstanding. This criticism evokes the same mistake, as if any one were to assert that primitive languages lack grammatical rules simply because primitive peoples are not conscious of rules, have no grammar. Unconsciously they apply the rules of their language without mistake. The discussion has gone astray because power is often thought to be mechanical on the analogy of our idea of natural forces. The idea of power is extremely emotional, because it is called forth by some unusual phenomenon which strikes the mind and stirs up emotions. This is the reason for the opinion which makes power a *mysterium tremendum et fascinosum*, and finally holy.

Power appears as a conscious general concept only in an advanced stage of development. Space forbids discussion of this development among Polynesians and Indians, and such a discussion is not absolutely necessary for these considerations. We must now consider the way in which power appears, the individual phenomena. Analogies with our ideas of natural power have a large place and play their part in leading the discussion astray. The comparison with electricity, which passes from one object to another, with which it comes in contact is common. So the analogy of infection by contact is common. But these analogies are not good because they introduce ideas unknown to primitive mentality. If one wishes to grasp the question aright, one has to remember that in this case too, associations are at work. If a man is especially lucky in war, in the chase, in fishing, this faculty

is associated not only with the man but also with the weapon or the implement.[8] Power may be associated with an object because this object attracts attention to itself by a special appearance. It is related in Melanesia that a stone concerning which such an idea has been conceived is laid at the root of a tree that it may grow better and bear fruit. And then there is the great mass of amulets which are still not obsolete, i.e., mascots.

Fetishism: Fetishism is explained by such circumstances as these. Whatever an object is it may become a fetish, if attention is directed to it by some fortuitous happening, so that one believes that it is endowed with power. It happens that it is thrown away if its power fails. Negroes in western Africa have medicine bags which contain various things, but these must be connected with important happenings or taken from strong and wild animals or famous men, i.e., power is associated with them. The medicine bags of the Indian are of a like kind. But a ceremony is added, a consecration and a sacrifice, for the religion of the negroes is not the most elementary kind. They have also fetishes in human form, but the power is not invested in the figure but in a kind of red clay with which the figure is smeared, without this it is of no value.

Taboo: Marett wrote a paper on the tabu-mana formula as a minimum definition of Religion.[9] It is a program directed against animism, and in his book The Threshold of Religion he discusses the question of whether taboo is negative magic. He denies Frazer's opinion, to which I formerly adhered that taboo depends on a conscious averting of power. My comparison with electricity is erroneous and lends color to such a view. The basic element is the feeling of something in power which Marett calls 'mysterious'; instead of this word which admits various meanings I should say strong emotional feelings raised by the supernormal, the unusual, the unexpected, but in certain circumstances reverence too is raised. Fear awakens the impulse to be on one's guard, reverence that of keeping distance. When these feelings, associated with the manifestations of power, bring about actions and become fixed,

[8] Examples in Marett, The Threshold of Religion, pp. 120 et seqq., and above, p. 80, n. 4.

[9] Archiv für Religionswissenschaft, xii, 1909, pp. 186 et seqq.

a taboo rule is there. If something similar to a concept of power has been developed, e.g., among the Polynesians, the taboo rules appear as negative magic, and the idea may arise that power can be restored to the man who has lost it. Because taboo is an interdiction it achieves a very great social importance and is supported by social injunctions, common opinion, punishments, and what is extremely effective, fear of infringement. Thus, is created that outgrowth of taboos so often and vividly described.

The second metaphor through which the transference of power is visualized, that is, infection, corresponds better to a primitive stage. For infection can be thought of concretely as a soiling. If one comes into contact with a person or an object which is endowed with power, something of this quality adheres to the one who comes into contact with him or it, just as dirt adheres to the one who comes into contact with something dirty. It is an association depending on a fact. It is possible to wash or to scrape off dirt, to suck snake poison from the bite, or if some poison has entered the body a purgative may be used. The same methods are, of course, used to get rid of that which possesses a noxious power, diseases, pollution, etc. Diseases and infection by power are treated by the same means. Purifications take a large place in all religions.

Magic: The next hotly debated question is magic, i.e., Frazer's theory and the criticism of it.[10] In very broad outlines the doctrine of Frazer is that magic differs essentially from religion. Magic is primitive natural science founded on mechanical causality, while religion looks to a deity who can say yes or no. Magical acts operate according to associations, and consequently magic is homeopathic or sympathetic. Others have continued this reasoning and said that magic is the first stage and religion is a higher, subsequent stage of evolution. This construction is weak and was soon subjected to a serious criticism by Marett.[11] Younger scholars pass it over because they oppose Marett on other points. It is not possible to state a difference between magic and religion

[10] I refer to the lucid exposition by Dr. Westermarck, Ritual and Belief in Morocco, vol. I, pp. 37 et seqq. Agreeing theoretically with Sir James Frazer he emphasizes the 'mysterious,' the supernatural as the common element of religion and magic.

[11] From Spell to Prayer, The Threshold of Religion, pp. 33 et seqq.

in the earliest stage as Frazer does nor between magical and religious acts. The latter too make use of the supernormal power which is the basis of both. Frazer's comparison with natural science and his reference to mechanical causality is especially contestable, in fact extravagant. Even so one should not overlook the fact that it comes near a truth, the difference between the living and the dead — compare what was said concerning interment — observed even by animals. A horse takes fright easily at a moving object, much less at an object at rest. Acts are determined by this difference. I read some years ago a short article by the Swedish journalist Erik Lindorm with the title, "The machine ennobles." It hits the mark. If the horse is not able to pull the cart, the driver swears and whips the horse in order to force him to use the last ounce of his strength. If the auto stops, the chauffeur mumbles an oath perhaps, but he does not whip the machine, he gets out to examine and mend the defect. Primitive people make the same difference, but it is confused by ambivalence, an important factor, to which I shall come back. There is further confusion from the fact that it is possible to treat a living being, a man, as a thing without a will, as dead, i.e., to use coercion against it. Theoretically this is the fundamental difference between magic and religion. Magic tries to attain its purpose by coercion, subduing the will, if there is any, in primitive peoples often through a very effective suggestion. Religion tries to attain it by benevolence, grace, free will. It happens also in higher religions, e.g., in Greece, that people threaten and try to coerce the gods; primitive people do so, if they have gods or similar beings.

Marett advanced the opinion that magic is a projection of the will in acts and words. I begin with an example which is similar to that adduced by him, the bull which gores the coat. I have heard that a certain farmer, when he became angry, took his cap from his head, threw it on the ground, stamped on it, and swore. This is an elementary outburst of wrath, not even of will. It is not rudimentary magic. Something must be added to make magic of it, and this must be implied in the word which the criticism of Marett's view adds, a wish, for a wish implies a purpose, and only when a purpose exists is it possible to speak of magic, even if only rudimentary. This wish, this purpose, implies that the

act is often accompanied by words. Acts and words go together even in an elementary outburst of anger, how much the more, if a definite purpose is present in the mind. Magic is at least directed emotion, the adjective implies the essential difference, and Marett erred because he did not observe this. When magic attains to fixed forms, magic formulas are created and texts are borrowed from myths and cults. Marett's criticism is further directed against Frazer's division of magic into homeopathic and sympathetic magic according to associations, because of similarity and contiguity in space or time. To begin we must state that a magic exists which imitates an action of daily life producing a certain effect; the difference is that in magic this effect is produced in a supernormal way. An example is the Australian *arungaquiltha*, a spear which is directed against the man who is to be killed, whatsoever the distance is, further words are added expressing the purpose.[12] Such a magic depends on an association only insofar as the magical act imitates a common act, and this is not what an association means in this connection. In most cases, however, and especially in developed magic Frazer is right, and so much so that it is superfluous to adduce examples. The objection that, e.g., a warrior who wants to destroy an enemy by magical means bores through a bulb which does not resemble a man, or that the dolls which are used in magical arts have no resemblance whatever to the man who is to be destroyed, is a misunderstanding. Here the abovementioned voluntative association enters; it associates arbitrary things with that which is in one's mind. Cf. the Malay formula: it is not wax I scorch, it is the liver, the heart, and the spleen of N. N. I scorch. That incantations and songs are added is no objection to the importance of associations. Such formulas and songs, derived from myth or religion, belong to a fairly advanced stage of magic, their purpose is to awaken and to strengthen the supernormal power. Their connection with the special occasion upon which they are used is often no more than loose.

Mantics: (i.e. Mantic procedures). I come now to mantics which are very important in early religions. There is no reason here to enter upon certain psychopathic states of mind which are very important for the science of religion and for mantics: sor-

[12] Cf. *lonka-lonka*, Marett, loc. cit., p. 75.

cerers, Pythia, etc. Nor is there any reason to speak of dreams foreboding the future. I note only that primitive people do not know the difference between dream and reality as clearly as we do. I do not know how dreams are interpreted by primitive peoples, I do know from ancient Greece that there they are interpreted by the aid of analogies, i.e., associations, sometimes of contrast. They may be rather far-fetched.

I wish to direct attention to omina, fortuitous signs and other oracles of such a kind. My opinion derives from something which happened when I was a school boy. One morning when I was on my way to the school I walked at the side of a cart. During morning prayer I played the fool which was observed by a teacher and resulted in a warning from the rector. It was a long time before I could again walk beside a cart, so that I went either faster or slower in order to escape the cart. This was not only a disagreeable recollection but also a feeling that something evil could happen, if by any chance I ran alongside of a cart. In this case two things were associated absolutely fortuitously through the unpleasant event which followed the coincidence. I think that a lot of omina have come into being in this manner, through fortuitous association, e.g., bird omina, encounters with certain persons, a word heard in passing, something happening when the mind was filled with thoughts on something imminent, which, consequently, was associated with the former.[13] Other omina are of another kind. The heavenly phenomena, eclipses, etc., loom largely as omina. Here emotion is still stronger, one fears that such an unusual sign might be followed by misfortune. The interpretation is secondary. Signs from sacrifices are somewhat different. That which is offered to the gods must be blameless; it is forbidden to sacrifice crippled animals. If it appears that the interior organs of the sacrificed animal are abnormal in some respect, this arouses scruples and is interpreted as a sign of the anger of the gods and of imminent bad events. Such signs were elaborated into an extensive doctrine, Greek inspection of victims and Babylonian and Etruscan inspection of livers. The development of mantics was fostered because it was in the hands of specialists. Some oracle methods make use of arbitrary associa-

[13] Cf. my Gesch. d. gr. Rel., I, p. 153.

tions. Pegs are thrown and their situation noted. Dice are thrown and the result interpreted according to some system. A Greek papyrus has, e.g., a list of Homeric verses preceded by figures indicating the casts of three dice. The Lappish *noids* used a drum on whose cover images are depicted, referring to the life and interests of the people. On the cover a ring is laid which is moved when the *noid* beats his drum, and the oracles are given by the images which the ring touches when moving. The kind of mantics treated until now depends on an arbitrary linking up of two events which are near to each other in time, a linking up effectuated by emotion and the tension of interest.

This linking up can be broken. Starting from their idea of inevitable fate modern scholars find this unreasonable, for a future event which is predicted *must* happen. But if we have a clear understanding of the nature of omina as described above, it appears that the linking up may be broken. I avoided walking at the side of a cart in order to avoid unpleasant events, a student friend of mine turned and went back if a cat crossed the street before him. In antiquity a sign, an omen, a prediction was often valid only if it was accepted: *omen accipio*, see, e.g., Hdt, I, 62: it could be rejected, Hdt, V, 56. This circumstance has contributed to an opinion equating omina and predictions with magic.[14] An omen works with magical power, it is said, so that the predicted future event happens because of the prediction. It is evidently superfluous to appeal to the supernormal power in this case for the interpretation, the mentioned linking up depending on a fortuitous association, and the possibility of breaking it are sufficient for our understanding. The same idea is relevant in regard to those predictions which are formed by sorcerers and prophets. A prediction is not only a statement that a certain event will happen, but a powerful word which determines the future; prediction comes near a curse. The sorcerer prophesies by virtue of the *mana* by which he is filled. He is inspired by a god or a daemon, he is in a state of ecstasy. But here we touch upon psychopathological states of mind which do not belong to the kind of magic which is treated here. Such a prophecy comes near a curse and it is known how strongly a curse can impress the mind of the cursed

[14] Cf. my Gesch. d. gr. Rel., I, pp. 152 et seqq.

man; it happens that the curse is fulfilled through its psychological effect. Read what Westermarck tells about the Moroccan custom of laying *'ār* upon someone. The supernormal power is working because of emotionality and suggestibility. A prophecy may produce the like emotional and suggestive effect, but this is in reality not a part of mantics. The kind of mantics treated here is fully explained through fortuitous, arbitrary associations which depend on interest.

Ambivalence: That ambivalence of representations mentioned above is very important to a right understanding of primitive mentality. I do not mean the tension between opposite feelings and representations of which psychology speaks, but simply the fact that man is compartmentalized; sometimes he attributes something to one compartment of his mind, sometimes to another. The dead body may be considered to be dead stuff and be removed, it may also be considered to be living in a certain sense, if the associations with the functions of life are not cut off. An animal may be considered to be an animal to be hunted or a noxious animal which must be killed, but also as endowed with supernormal power. A tree may be treated as dead stuff, hewn down, used for fuel or timber, etc., but it may also be thought that it is endowed with power, and respect and cult may be devoted to it. A stone may become a fetish or an amulet, if through some chance a belief arises that it is endowed with power, respect and cult may be devoted to it. Primitive man is subject to the changing feelings of the moment. His ideas oscillate between two poles, one may say, one negative and another positive. One is represented by the common, dead stuff, the other by the living, that which is filled with power, supernormal power. His ideas are attracted to the latter pole by this emotion, which arises from the feeling of life and power. Only logic removes ambivalence and how difficult this is is proved by the common cult of images in higher religions. The idea of the god and his power is associated with his image, and it is very difficult to cut off this association.

Animatism, Personification: Personification is a word not very much used in the science of religion nowadays. It has got into bad repute because the personifications of abstract qualities, e.g., Justitia, Virtus, Fama, especially come into one's mind, in fact

the word implies a much wider sense. Aphrodite is not much more than a personification of sex appeal and sex action, Ares of war-madness and the turmoil of fighting. This is the case too concerning the Greek gods of nature. Zeus, the cloud-gatherer, thrower of the lightning, sender of the rain, is in this respect a personification of atmospheric phenomena; Artemis of the free life of nature, Demeter of the crops and the corn, etc. But these are gods of a highly developed religion with which we are not concerned here. Here, our interest is the soil basis from which personification springs or, if you like, an embryonic personification, which consists in the fact that man ascribes will and feeling to dead things and seeks for the origin of certain phenomena in will and feeling. This is called animatism, a soul is ascribed to dead things. This is a mistaken application of that which is the basis of man's ability to understand others, namely that he conceives of them according to analogy with himself. The error is that here ambivalence enters the picture, under the influence of an emotion man does not distinguish between that which is living or dead. There is no need to speak of animals. Primitive man did not distinguish clearly and essentially as civilized man does between the 'soul-less' animal and man. I take the time-honored standard example of the child who hurts himself against a chair and who gets angry, and beats the chair. This does not by any means imply any conscious reasoning, the thing is simply that the child in its anger treats the chair as it would treat a playmate who had hurt it, but it is also evident that such an act implies the attitude which is called animatism: the dead thing is treated, though unconsciously and under the influence of an emotion, in the same manner as a living being.

But there is no need of any emotion producing such confusion, for confusion it is from our point of view. A child of four years said of a brook bubbling between stones: see, how the brook wrinkles and frowns! The same boy sat at the breakfast table, the sun shone on the cloth, suddenly the sun vanished, covered by a cloud. He said: now the sun went home to have breakfast. Soon the sun came back and the boy said: Now the sun has put on nice clothes, now it comes back. Such examples show that Max Müller's disease of language is not so far from reality as is some-

times said, i.e., his thesis that nature myths originate from metaphors which were mistaken for real. Primitive languages are known to be very concrete. Primitive peoples are compelled, if need arises, to deduce from their concrete expressions means of expression for such notions as cannot be seen or felt. Personification may sometimes have arisen in the manner indicated by Max Müller, though he immensely exaggerated its importance.

We come back to animatism, the idea man has under certain circumstances, that dead things, like himself, are endowed with feeling and will, and we add, moreover, endowed with supernormal power. The real difficulty is to understand how personification could originate from animatism. It is hardly sufficient to say that man has an innate propensity to represent to himself anything that feels or wills as of a living being. In regard to animals it is simple, for they are living, feeling, and have a will, and primitive man makes no essential distinction between man and animal. It was sometimes possible to ascribe supernormal power to animals. If one wished to draw on this, one had to turn to the animal, but one reached the animal only as something to be hunted and the chase is another thing. Hunting tribes perform, however, elaborate ceremonies with the killed animal. Other primitive peoples, e.g., the Australians, make an image of the animal. In this way a cult of animals may arise without any necessity to insert totemism as an intermediate link. Greek gods have many traces of theriomorphism, though survivals of totemism are absent in Greece, and the Egyptian gods with their bodies and heads of animals certainly do not originate from totemism. Thus the question of the origin of personification and especially of anthropomorphism arises. Why have the powers, endowed with will and feeling, which dwell in stones, trees, rivers, which send diseases, etc., been conceived of in human shape? There are animal shapes too, and mixed shapes. One is not quite content with the general propensity of man to anthropomorphize will and feeling. It is perhaps permissible to advance a guess, for it is no more. I refer to the beings which appear in the belief in the so-called High Gods, which I discuss later. If an answer is wanted to the question as to how the world was made such as it is, or how customs and ceremonies originated, the most simple answer

is to say that a man made this in olden times. Just as a man makes an implement or builds a cabin, so has this man made the world and all that is in it, he has invented customs and ceremonies; in this he is similar to the 'religious formulator' of Radin. These figures are anthropomorphic as well as theriomorphic, e.g., the thunder-bird and the muskrat which created the world according to some Indians. My guess is that the anthropomorphic form of these figures may have contributed to creating the belief that the beings, endowed with will and power, which dwell in trees, stones, which send diseases, etc., have an anthropomorphic or theriomorphic shape. The above mentioned beings, the so-called High Gods, occur chiefly among peoples on a low level of culture; I do not remember having encountered beings similar to nymphs, daemons, etc., among the Australians or even among the Indians. In fact anthropomorphism is not general, it is proper to certain peoples. Animatism is the fundamental stuff of which religion is created, insofar as you understand religion as applying to a higher, say a supernormal, power which is endowed with feeling and free will.

The High God: *Le dernier cri* in the science of religion is the belief in the High God. The idea is fairly old, it was advanced fifty years ago by Andrew Lang, whose scientific importance was not sufficiently appreciated, even by his compatriots, because his interests were exceptionally wide and he was a fascinating writer. His idea at that time met only with criticism, because animism and soon preanimism were dominant. It was, however, not forgotten and was taken up by Pettazzoni in an important book. He tried to show that the High God was a god of the heavens. It became much more famous through the extensive work of the learned Father Schmidt. He starts from the hypothesis of *Kulturkreise* and he tries to prove that the peoples on the lowest level of civilization, *Urkulturvölker*, pygmies and pygmoids, precisely know the belief in the High God. The hypothesis of *Kulturkreise* is a brittle construction. Further one may ask whether the cultural poverty of these peoples is original or perhaps due to impoverishment. That the African pygmies have not a special language but speak the languages of the surrounding negro tribes proves in any case their dependency on others. Father Schmidt

himself says: there is also a simplicity which depends on impoverishment and decay, but he adds cautiously: consequently this is later than that more perfect one which preceded it.[15] The cult which Father Schmidt ascribes to the High God, the so-called first fruit sacrifice, seems doubtful, because it is nowhere said that the sacrifice is brought to the High God: I cannot but think that Father Schmidt would have adduced this, were it anywhere to be found.

Although certain of his followers abandon the hypothesis of the *Kulturkreise* they proceed further including the High Gods of the old culture peoples in the discussion. Thus they construe an all-embracing High God, a god of the heavens, of the weather, lightning, and thunder, a sungod, creator of the world, god of fertility, bisexual, guardian of morals, punisher of wrong-doing, Lord of Fate, omniscient, omnipresent, almighty, eternal. It is asserted that the gods of polytheism originated by the splitting off of certain of the High God's functions. This opinion resembles that which was popular among certain German scholars fifty years ago, namely, the so-called hypostases; lesser gods originated from greater gods by the splitting off of certain of their functions. Research has proved later that the procedure, generally speaking, was the inverse one. Turning to the mentioned complex of the functions and qualities of the High God it is first to be noted that certain words in reference to an earlier time and stage have not the significance which they imply to us. An idea of eternity such as ours is highly developed. In Homer still the gods are neither omniscient nor present everywhere. They know that which is necessary under the given circumstances, but no more, many things are concealed from them. They appear if needed, but they are not almighty in our sense of the word, they are merely mightier than man. Fate, in our sense of something that is determined previously and inevitably, is a late achievement of thought.[16] The gods send events, destinies, not the coherent series of Fate. It is not permissible to confuse beliefs of primitive

[15] Religionen hos urkulturens folk, p. 98.

[16] The fatalism of Homer is something different which I treated in my Gesch. d. gr. Rel., I, pp. 338 et seqq., and so too the Babylonian tables of Fate in the New Years festival are a product of astrological belief.

peoples with modern ideas. In regard to the punishment of wrongdoing it is often said that the being from whom originated the customs of the tribe keeps watch over and punishes trespassers, just as a man, a father or a chief, who sees that his injunctions are not obeyed, punishes trespassers. This being seldom punishes himself, but punishment is administered through social means and it is sometimes brought about through the strong suggestibility, e.g., if a taboo is disobeyed. The god of the heavens gives fertility because he gives rain, but fertility depends on many other circumstances, and in fact this function is not very apparent in the High God. If all these functions and qualities which are borrowed from higher religions are removed, and if we keep to the High God such as we find him among peoples on a low cultural level, generally speaking, two functions remain, the creator and the god of the heavens. The creator, 'the maker,' was understood rightly by Söderblom. He is, so to speak, a mythological, more correctly, an aetiological, god, and because of this he is a *deus otiosus*. He does not always appear in human shape but very often in the shape of an animal too. In regard to the former I quote Andrew Lang: [17] "As soon as a man had the idea of 'making' things, he might conjecture as to a Maker of things which he himself had not made and could not make. He would regard this unknown Master as a 'magnified non-natural man.' . . . This conception of a magnified non-natural man, who is a Maker, being given, his Power would be recognized, and fancy would clothe one who had made such useful things with certain other moral attributes, such as Fatherhood, goodness and regard for the ethics of his children, these ethics having been developed naturally in the evolution of social life. In all this there is nothing 'mystical,' nor anything, as far as I can see, beyond the limited mental powers of any beings that deserve to be called human." In regard to the word 'father' which arouses certain religious ideas in us, we must remember that the word which we translate by 'father' in languages which do not know of relative designations of kinship, applies to every man of the age-class of the father, it signifies a man of a certain advanced age generally. One may have a certain reverence for a man of this age, not

[17] In the preface to the second edition of his Making of Religion, p. x.

more. A similar reasoning applies to the god of the heavens. Concerning the sun and the moon primitive peoples have the same idea as the boy who said that the sun has gone home to have its breakfast. There are many myths of this kind, e.g., among the Australians, Eskimos, etc. Who hurls the thunderbolt? Who lets the rain stream down? It may be a man or an animal such as the thunder-bird of the Indians. This is the most simple reply, but one may also form cosmological myths.

The High God as he appears in the Uppsala school is of a piece with Hooke's 'ritual pattern' which plays so great a rôle in its divine kingship ideology. The ritual pattern is found whole nowhere, it is pieced together from parts, found at various places, because they enter into a logically coherent connection. The pattern is in fact always found 'disintegrated.' The ritual pattern is consequently a logical construction whose existence is not proved in the world of realities. In the like way the functions and qualities of the High God are pieced together from various sides; even among a people on such a high cultural level as the Greeks some function is absent: Zeus did not create the world. The splitting off of certain functions and qualities of the High God, from which the polytheistic gods are said to originate, is in fact a disintegration. In this case too a pattern is constructed which is not found anywhere and the existence of which is not proved and impossible to prove.

That fervid adherent of the High God Belief, Professor Widengren, is, in his construction of the High God, guilty of the same logical error which he criticizes severely in his discussion of the *mana*. He generalizes ideas which need not have any connection and do not have it. I know quite well that my limited knowledge of primary facts is not sufficient for a thoroughgoing criticism. To achieve this one would need a long life such as that of Father Schmidt and not the little which remains to me and which I must use in the problems which concern me more intimately. But I was compelled to clear up my own thoughts on the basis of such knowledge as I have. I know quite well that these considerations will be anathematized as a superannuated evolutionism. Widengren's last book has the title *Religioncns ursprung* (The Origin of Religion) and preaches the belief in the High

God. Consequently this is the origin of religion. But the question how this belief was created in man's mind cannot be put to one side. The ineradicable desire of man to trace the reason for everything cannot be suppressed — *e pur se muove*. If this question is rejected the only consequent and logical standpoint is the *Uroffenbarung* of Father Schmidt. God revealed himself to man.

During my long life I have seen so many theories of the science of religion accepted as a solution of the problems, dominate and even dominate tyrannically, contested, and brought down to their proper proportions, that I have learned the necessity of criticising *le dernier cri* too. I am not inclined to fall down and pay respect exclusively to the idols of the day. Only the poor ruins are left of the proud chateau of nature mythology, animism was ousted by preanimism, the claims of totemism to unlock all locks were shown to be an illusion, the mechanical causality of the doctrine of power and of magic was rejected and the importance of emotion emphasized. However, if one is not the prisoner of preconceived opinions, one must acknowledge, justly, that none of these idols of a day has been vain. All of them have taught us to understand better the problem of religion and its origin, after criticism has reduced them to their true importance. This is true too in regard to the belief in the High God. It was put in the shadow by other dominating opinions and was pushed to one side. It does not give the answer to the last question, if one does not trust in the *Uroffenbarung*, but it renders an important contribution to the understanding of religous development, I purposely use the anathematized word evolution. We have to distinguish the two figures discussed above. In later religions the gods are often not the creators of the world, nor in the religions of primitive peoples is the god of the heavens. This god is a simple personification of the kind which has been discussed above. It is possible, perhaps likely, that he belonged to certain peoples, e.g., the Indo-Europeans, from the beginning, has developed and has become a very important factor in their religion. But I cannot believe and there is nothing to prove that the other gods of a polytheistic religion were created by splitting off from him. At best it may be possible that he has been 'so to speak' a midwife helping other gods to spring off from the animatism

which endowed natural objects with a soul, so that they got a shape and were seen by phantasy, personifications in the sense in which the word is taken here.

Phenomenology: Finally something must be said of phenomenology, a recent method of the science of religion, because it is at the back of the new opinions. It classifies religious phenomena according to their similarity or kinship. The question may be asked whether phenomenology has any further purpose than putting the phenomena into their respective boxes, whether it tries to find a connection between them. It cannot be the historical connection, development, and cross-influences. For phenomenology puts together phenomena from different peoples, differing as to age and development. In principle it cares neither for time nor for history. Consequently, if any connection is sought for, it must consist in a quality of thought which is common to mankind and acts originating from these thoughts. If it be so phenomenology comes very near to the old comparative science of religion against which it opposes. The difference is that while the latter is occupied with simple phenomena, the former is occupied with complicated ideas and rites. The risk is that the phenomena may be oversimplified and adapted according to the scheme into which they are put. In spite of all the tendency to find development, evolutionism, to use this bad word, is apparent. For a development to higher forms cannot be denied. Just as the faculty of thought is developed, so that, e.g., a Greek philosopher thinks more clearly than, say, an Australian native or a farmer of olden times, so religious ideas are developed to higher forms. There is a difference between the Baiame of the Australians, the Zeus of the Greek, and Jahwe in the later Jewish religion.

Yours ever,

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THE NAME OF CHRISTIANS

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The origins of the name *Χριστιανοί* are narrated in the Acts of the Apostles as follows. After Stephen's martyrdom, some believers from Cyprus and Cyrene, who had left Jerusalem, preached at Antioch. Their success became known at Jerusalem, and "the community which was in Jerusalem" sent Barnabas to Antioch. Barnabas in turn brought Paul from Tarsus. For a whole year they worked together and taught many people. *Ἐγένετο δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ὅλον συναχθῆναι ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ καὶ διδάξαι ὄχλον ἱκανόν, χρηματίσαι τε πρώτως ἐν Ἀντιοχείᾳ τοὺς μαθητὰς χριστιανούς* (Act, Ap. XI, 26).[1]

I

Modern commentators mostly understand the passage as saying that the new name was given (in jest) to the disciples of Jesus by the heathen population of Antioch.[2] Some scholars assume that the name Christians, having the Latin ending *-ianus*, must have been given to the new sect by Roman authorities at Antioch or even at Rome.[3] The verb *χρηματίζω*, used in Acts, seems to confirm this interpretation. For, as it has been recently stressed,[4] this verb indicates official or legal style. This latter observation is, of course, exact. When a contemporary of the Apostles sign his petition [5] as *Λιμναῖος Λιμναίον κ(αὶ) ὡς χ(ρηματίζω)* he does not refer to any nickname he may have, but to his title of deputy-secretary (*ἐπίτροπος γραμματέως*).

[1] Mss. variants are not noted since they have no relevancy to our subject.

[2] See, beside the commentaries and the articles in Biblical Dictionaries, H. J. Cadbury, in The Beginnings of Christianity V (1933), 383–86 (who gives additional bibliographical items); A. v. Harnack, Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums (4th ed. 1924) I, 424–7; Th. Zahn, Introduction to the N. T. II (1909), 191.

[3] The theory that the name really began at Rome comes from Bruno Bauer, quoted in Zahn, l.c., while R. Paribeni, suggested the formation of it in the *officium* of the Roman governor of Syria. See E. Peterson, in Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati I (1946), p. 8.

[4] E. Peterson, op. cit., p. 3.

[5] P. Osloenses II, 21 (71 A.D.). Cf. F. Zucker, Gnomon, 1933, p. 655.

Although critics are not agreed whether the Roman administration or the population of Antioch bestowed the new name on the followers of the Nazarene, they all agree that the term was invented by non-Christians. That means that the commentators tacitly assume the passive meaning ("were called") of the active aorist *χρηματίσαι*. This postulate goes back to Guillaume Budé, the illustrious restorer of Greek studies in France (1467–1540). Accepted by Henri Estienne in his Thesaurus Graecae Linguae (1572) s.v., it acquired, one might say, canonical authority in the course of time.[6] But is Budé's interpretation right? I think not, on grounds both grammatical and lexicographical.

First the lexicographical matter. The verb *χρηματίζω negotiari*, which already was a technical term of the Athenian chancellery in the time of Pericles,[7] acquired later, as one of its numerous meanings, the signification of official designation. With this sense, the verb (in the extant Greek literature) occurs for the first time in Polybius. He tells, for instance, that Prince Achaeus, in revolt against Antiochus III, proceeded to Laodicea in Phrygia, where "he put on the diadem and also for the first time ventured to bear the title of king and to write (sc. as *Basileus*) to cities."[8] We know the Hellenistic ceremonial referred to by Polybius.[9] A new king was installed in his office, when, wearing his regalia, he was shown to the multitude and proclaimed *Basileus*. It is evident, on the other hand, that when Antiochus III protested to the same Achaeus *ἐπὶ τῷ τετολμηκέναι διάδημα περιθέσθαι καὶ βασιλέα χρηματίζειν*, he remonstrated against Achaeus' taking of the royal title officially.[10] That takes care of all other instances where *χρηματίζω* refers to the royal style.[11] The verb does not mean

[6] I did not regard it necessary to follow the history of interpretation. I only note that as late as 1828, S. T. Bloomfield, Recensio Synoptica Annotationis Sacrae IV, p. 376, presents the now common explanation as a novelty.

[7] See, e.g., I.G. I, 57; 63, etc. On the same word in the meaning "give an oracle" cf. L. Robert, Hellenica I (1940), 72 and II (1946), 1948.

[8] Pol. V, 57, 5: *διάδημα τε περιέθετο καὶ βασιλεὺς τότε πρῶτον ἐτόλμησε χρηματίζειν καὶ γράφειν πρὸς τὰς πόλεις.*

[9] See on this *ἀνάδειξις* my note in Mélanges Emile Boisacq (1937), p. 120.

[10] Pol. V, 57, 2.

[11] See, e.g. Diod. I, 44, 1: XX, 53, 2; Plut. Anton. 54; Jos. Antt. VIII, 157; XIII, 318; Euseb. V. Const. 18; h.e. I, 7, 12; Philostr. V. Apoll. V, 35: *ὥσπερ αὐτοκράτωρ χρηματίζων τε καὶ πράττων.*

that someone was called "king," but that he officially has assumed the title.[12]

The other group of passages deals with official designation of citizenship. For instance, Flavius Josephus asserts that Alexander's successors allowed the Jewish settlers in Alexandria to use the name of "Macedonians." [13] A papyrus, written under Augustus, makes clear the meaning of this claim: Alexander, son of Nicodemus (who was a Jew as another record proves), styles himself "Macedonian" in this document.[14] Again, *χρηματίζειν* cannot have here a passive meaning: nobody gave the appellation of "Macedonians" to the Jews in Alexandria; on the contrary, the Hellenic population resented their pretension to this quality. Likewise, if Posidonius of Apamea in Syria later had the style of Rhodian,[15] that does not mean that someone gave him this appellation. He simply became a citizen of Rhodos. Plutarch mentions the law in Xanthus that citizens should be named after their mothers.[16] Again, the verb *χρηματίζειν* refers here to the name one indicates in official records.[17] Numerous documents make clear the usage.[18] For instance, at Oxyrchynchus, illegitimate children had to be styled after the mother. Thus we have the style: [19] *Εὐδαιμονίδι . . . χρηματιζούσῃ μητρὸς Σινθώνιος.* An-

[12] Cf., e.g., Philo, Leg. ad Gaium 346: Caligula decided to introduce his cult at the Temple of Jerusalem *ἵνα Διὸς Ἐπιφανοῦς Νέου χρηματίζῃ Γάιον.*

[13] Jos. B.J. II, 488: *χρηματίζειν ἐπέτρεψαν Μακεδόνας.*

[14] B.G.U. IV, 1132: *παρὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Νικοδίμου Μακεδό(νος).*

[15] Athen. VI, 252: *Ποσειδώνιος δ' ὁ Ἀπαμεύς, ὕστερον δὲ Ῥόδιος χρηματίσας . . . φησί κ.τ.λ.* Cf. Strabo XIII, 609: Metrodorus of Scepsis made a rich marriage at Chalcedon, *καὶ ἐχρημάτιζε Χαλκηδόνιος.*

[16] Plut. de virt. mulier. 248 d: *νόμος ἦν τοῖς Ξανθίοις μὴ πατροθὲν ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μητέρων χρηματίζειν.*

[17] Cf., too, Jos. Antt. XI, 343; C. Apion. II, 30; App. Sicil. 6.: M. Antonius in Crete: *οὐ πρᾶξαι καλῶς, χρηματίσαι δ' ὅμως διὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν Κρητικός.*

[18] For Papyri cf. W. Schubart, Arch. für Papyrusforschung V, p. 114; F. v. Woess, Untersuchungen über Urkundenwesen (1925), 319; V. Arangio-Ruiz, Bull. de l'Institut d'Egypte XXIX (1948), 105. The usage is the same in inscriptions. For instance, the athletes at the festival of Sebasteia at Naples were required *ἀπογράφεσθαι ὀνό[ματα ὡς ἂν χρη]ματιζῇ ἢ πα[τροθεν]*, that is (as the editors observe) either the official (Roman) name or the usual Greek filiation (Inschr. von Olympia, 56.) An (unpublished?) inscription from Sagalassos in Pisidia (quoted M. Lambertz, Glotta, 1914, 150): *Αὐρ. Μειδιανὸς Ἀτταλιανὸς ὁ τάχων* (in short) *χρηματίσας Ἀτταλιανός.* Ch. Michel. Recueil d'inscr. grecques (1900), 1342: *ἐπέγραψαμεν εἰς στήλην κατὰ τὸν νόμον· Ἐργόφιλον πατρὸς οὐ ἂν χρηματίδζῃ.*

[19] P. Oxyr. III, 505. Philo, q. deus sit immut. 121 refers to the same usage.

other instance,[20] in the time of the Apostles, a certain Pnephrotes styled himself in a contract: Πέρσης τῆς ἐπιγονῆς. In another document it is said of him: τὸν χρηματίσαντα Πέρσην τῆς ἐπιγονῆς κατ' ἑτέραν συγχώρησιν. This active meaning of the verb is established without doubt by the Roman regulation which punished with the confiscation of a fourth of the estate the person using a false appellation and those who knowingly concur therein.[21] It is evident that οἱ ἀκαταλλήλως χρηματίζοντες of this decree are not the people who receive improper appellation, but those who assume it. These observations, by the way, make clear the sense of another passage in the New Testament. In Romans (7, 3), Paul says that a woman, married to another man, while her first husband lives, μοιχαλὶς χρηματίσει. That is always rendered as meaning: "she shall be called an adulteress." But Paul is very exact in legal terminology. The bigamous woman, with her name written in the *ketubah* or into *tabulae nuptiales* of the second marriage, styles herself (according to Paul's view) as an adulteress. This interpretation is confirmed by the next verse: remarried as a widow she will not be an adulteress. As μὴ εἶναι here, χρηματίσει in the other part of antithesis refers to the status of the woman and not to her reputation.

Let us now turn to the grammatical side of the question. Surely, there are many active forms used as passives of other verbs.[22] But, as a rule, in this case both verbs have no passive or, at least, no passive of the required meaning. Πάσχω (which has no passive of its own) is used as the passive of ποιέω in the sense "suffer," which the passive of ποιέω does not have. Now, the verb χρηματίζω in its general meaning *negotiari* has a passive. On the other hand, the verbs of name-giving (καλέω, ὀνομάζω) have also their own passive forms. In the sense "bear name," the verb χρηματίζω could hardly be used with passive inflexions, for the meaning is here reflexive: "I style myself."[23] For the same

[20] P. Oxy. II, 271 (56 A.D.).

[21] B.G.U. V, § 42: οἱ ἀκαταλλήλως χρηματίζοντες τεταρτολογοῦνται καὶ οἱ εἰδότες καὶ συνχρηματίσαντες αὐτοῖς τεταρτολογοῦνται.

[22] B. L. Gildersleeve, Syntax of Classic Greek I (1900), 171; E. Mayser, Grammatik der Griechischen Papyri II, 1 (1926), p. 90.

[23] In some cases the shade of meaning is: "bear name." See, e.g. Euseb. Laud. Constant. 17, 14 (Eusebius Werke I, p. 258 cd. Heikel): τὴν κυριακὴν χρηματίζουσαν

reason, the nominative,[24] goes with it. For instance: Ἐβιωναῖοι χρηματίζουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ Ἰουδαίων τὸν Ἰησοῦν ὡς Χριστὸν παραδεξάμενοι. Were the verb of passive signification, it would require the subject expressed by παρά or ὑπό with the genitive. I cannot remember having come across that construction.[25]

We conclude that there is no reason to assume for the passage in Acts a meaning which does not occur in Greek elsewhere. The author of Acts says, that at Antioch the disciples started[26] to take on the style of Christians. That is also the unanimous interpretation of ancient readers who themselves used the same verb χρηματίζω almost daily.[27] They say that the Apostles "gave

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ἡμέραν. Cf., too, Philo de migr. Abrah. 25; Orig. de orat. 15, 4; Orig. Hom. I, 5 in Jer., p. 3, ed. Klostermann: Ἀβράαμ προφήτης ἐχρημάτισεν ἐν τῷ· προφήτης εστι κ.τ.λ. (Gen. 20, 7). Letter of the Constantinople Synod in Theodoret. Eccl. Hist. V, 9, 4: Antioch, ἐν ᾗ πρώτη τὸ τίμιον τῶν χριστιανῶν ἐχρημάτισεν ὄνομα. Orig. Hom. II in Lucam, p. 14 ed. Rauer (cf. in Mth. t. X, 12, p. 13 ed. Klostermann): δυνατὸν δὲ ἐκ τοῦ μηκέτι ἁμαρτάνειν χρηματίσαι ἀναμάρτητον. Appian. B.C. II, 111: Brutus and Cassius ἀεί παρὰ Καίσαρος τιμῆς καὶ πίστεως χρηματίζοντες ἄξιοι. J. Schweighaeuser in his edition (1785) Index s.v. suggests the meaning: *in rebus agendis versor.*

[24] Orig. C. Cels. II, 1. Cf. Orig. ad Afric. 6 (P.G. XI, 61).

[25] Sometimes the verb is used transitively. E. A. Sophocles, Greek Lexicon s.v. quotes Malalas, and Suicerus, Thesaurus Ecclesiasticus s.v. Basilius in Ps. 7, 1 (P.G. XXIX, 229) for this usage. But Origen already says χρηματίζιν αὐτούς C. Cels. V, 42, p. 46 Koetschau; ad Mth. t. X, 14, p. 17 Klostermann.

[26] On πρώτως here see Petersen, l.c. p. 3.

[27] Since dictionaries and commentaries rarely quote instances from Patristic works, I bring here some characteristic passages found in the early Church Fathers. The verb in the meaning of "calling" does not occur in the Apostolic Fathers or in the Apologists. The earliest instance seems to be in the Letter of the Church of Vienne (177 A.D.), in Eus. h.e. V, 1, 10. Epagathas intervenes to defend the Christians, he is executed himself: ἀνελήφθη . . . παράκλητος χριστιανῶν χρηματίσας, that is by his act, he did style himself "comforter." As the aorist form shows, the translation "he was called comforter" (when? during the *martyrium*?) is grammatically wrong. The verb (avoided by Clement of Alexandria) often occurs in Origen. See, e.g. Hom. X, 4 in Jer.: κἂν μυριάκις χρηματίζωσιν παρ' αὐτοῖς (Jews) σοφοί, οὐκ ἔστιν λόγος κυρίου ἔτι ἐν αὐτοις. Hieronymus (P.G. XIII, 362) renders it as follows: *qui sibi sapientiam vindicant.* Cf. Orig. op. cit., X, 6; XIV, 2 about the Jews: ἐν τῷ λαῷ τῷ χρηματίζαντι τοῦ θεοῦ.; XV, 3. Orig. C. Cels. I, 51; II, 1: "Ebion" means "poor," and those among the Jews who received Jesus as Christ Ἐβιωναῖοι χρηματίζουσιν. ib. III, 18: Egyptian priests who are styled "prophets" (τοῖς χρηματίζουσιν αὐτῶν μροφήταις); V, 42; VI, 27 about the Ophites: τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄφιως ὡς ἀρχηγοῦ τῶν καλῶν χρηματίσαι βουληθέντων. Orig. Cohort. 14:I will leave spiritual children ἵνα καὶ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ . . . χρηματίσω πατήρ. Orig. in Lucam Hom. X, p. 89 ed. Rauer: ἐπεὶ ἱερεύς τις ἐχρημάτισεν καὶ ἔδοξε ὑπεροχὴν ὀνόματος ἔχειν.

The same is the usage of Eusebius. Eusebius in V. Const. 17 says that in the Great Persecution, the Christians could not use their name: οὐδὲ μέχρι ψιλῆς ἐπηγορίας

themselves the name of Christians." [28] A Byzantine forger even fabricated the Apostolic decree ordering the name of the followers of Christ to be changed from "Galileans" to "Christians." [29] Chrysostomus ascribed the invention of the name to Paul.[30] A local patriot of Antioch gave the honor to Euodius, the first Bishop of Antioch.[31] Other people found in Isaiah 65, 15 ("He shall call His servants by a new name") a prophecy referring to the event. Accordingly Chrysostomus, Theodorus of Heracleia, Cyrillus of Jerusalem and Cyrillus of Alexandria think that the Holy Ghost (or Jesus himself) had inspired the Apostles at Antioch.[32]

τῶν θεοσεβῶν χρηματίζειν συνεχώρετο γένος. Eusebius in h.e. I, 2, 10 describing the appearances of angels remarks that they "styled themselves angels" (*ἀγγέλους χρηματίσαι λέγουσα*). In h.e. I, 2, 26 he writes: *τὸν ἡμέτερον σωτῆρα . . . υἱὸν ἀνθρώπου . . . χρηματίζοντα*; in h.e. (cf. VII, 19) III, 7, 8: James *τοῦ Κυρίου χρηματίζων ἀδελφός* that is James who was styled the Lord's brother (Cf. e.g. Acta Philippi p. 75 ed. Tischendorf: *μετὰ Ἰάκωβον τοῦ χρηματίσαντα ἀδελφὸν τοῦ κυρίου*). The title of James is given Galat. 1, 19. Eus. h.e. VIII, 13, 15. When Licinius was declared Augustus, that vexed Maximin, *μόνον καίσαρα παρὰ πάντας εἰς ἔτι τότε χρηματίζοντα.* In Eus. Dem. ev., e.g. III, 2, 35: *ἀπὸ βασιλικῆς φίλης τῆς Ἰούδα τὸ πᾶν Ἰουδαίων ἔθνος ἐχρηματίζεν, ὡς καὶ εἰς σήμερον Ἰουδαίους ὀνομάζεσθαι.*

[28] See e.g. Vigilius, Contra Arianos I, 64 (P.L. LXII, 194): *Tunc Apostoli convenientes Antiochiam, sicut eorum Luca narrante, indicant Acta, omnes discipulos novo nomine, id est Christianos appellant.* Epiph. Haer. XLII, 12, 3: *διὸ καὶ ὄνομα τῆς ἐκκλησίας οἱ πάντες ἐν ἐπέθεντο, οὐ ἑαυτῶν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κυρίου αὐτῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἀπὸ Ἀντιοχείας ἀρξαμένων χριστιανῶν καγεῖσθαι.*

Cf. Ps. Oecumen. ad Act. XI, 26 (P.G. CXVIII, 192); Niceph. Callist. Eccl. Hist. II, 6 (P.G. CXLV, 769); Theophyl. P.G. CXXV, 953. Tertull. Apol. 3; Euseb. h.e. II, 3, 3; Orig. ad. Mth. XVI, 13 (p. 88 ed. Klostermann) express the same interpretation implicitly.

[29] I. B. Pitra, Iuris Ecclesiastici Monumenta I (1864), p. 91: *τοὺς εἰς αὐτὸν πιστεύοντας Γαλιλαίους ἐκάλουν οἱ τότε ἄνθρωποι. Συνοδεύσαντες οὖν οἱ ἀπόστολοι ἐν Ἀντιοχείᾳ τῆς Συρίας ἐχρημάτισαν τοὺς Γαλιλαίους χριστιάνους ἐν πρώτοις ὀνομάζεσθαι.* On this forgery, allegedly found in Origen's library, see A. Harnack, Gesch. der altchrist. Literatur I (1893), 774.

[30] Chrysost. Hom. XXV, 1 in Acta (P.G. LX, 192); Hom. XVIII (XIX), 3 in Jo. (P.G. LIX, 122): we *οἱ τοῦ χριστοῦ καλούμεθα. Οὕτω γὰρ ἡμᾶς Παῦλος ὠνόμασεν.* Cf., too, Hom. VII, 7 in Mth. (P.G. LVII, 81) Ps. Ignat. ad Magn. 10 (long recension).

[31] Malalas, P.G. XCVII, 377, p. 246 ed. Oxon. about Euodius: *καὶ ἐπὶ αὐτοῦ χριστιανοὶ ὠνομάσθησαν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐπισκόπου Εὐόδιου προσομιλήσαντος αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐπιθήσαντος αὐτοῦς τό ὄνομα τοῦτο.*

[32] Theodor. Heracl. P.G. XVIII, 1373; Cyrill. Hieros. Catech. X, 16; XVII, 28 (P.G. XXXIII, 681); Cyrill. Alex. ad Is. LXV, 16 (P.G. LXX, 1417). Cf., too Hesychius, Interpretatio Isaiae Prophetae (ed. M. Faulhaber, 1900) ad l.; Hieron. ad l. (P.L. XXIV, 643) Chrys., Hom. XXV, 1 in Acta (P.G. LX, 192; *οὕτως διὰ τοῦτο ἐν Ἀντιοχείᾳ ἐχρηματίσθησαν καλεῖσθαι χριστιανοί.* But I suspect that the passive form *ἐχρηματίσθησαν* (in the meaning: receive revelation) is here an error for the active *ἐχρημάτισαν* (decided). For Theophylactus, who always copies

The usual argument against this traditional interpretation is that the word does not occur in the earliest Christian writers, except in Ignatius, who was a native of Antioch. But why should these epistolary communications from a Church leader (Paul, Peter, James, Clemens, Barnabas, etc.) to his community exhibit the official name of the believers? It was destined for the outside world. So, it appears in the New Testament in the mouth of King Agrippa (Act. 26, 28) and with reference to Christian martyrs (I Pe. 4, 16), and then, with the apologists it becomes a current term to use. Between themselves, the Christians rather employed the names of "brethren," "believers," "Saints," etc.[33] Cyprian addresses his work De lapsis to "brethren." Although he is writing about those who abjured Christianity during the Decian persecution, the term *Christiani*, if I am not mistaken, occurs here in one passage only (ch. 28), when the bishop speaks of acknowledgment of the quality of a Christian before the World: *et Christianum se putat qui ad Christum pertinere aut erubescit aut metuit*? Thus, the earlier Christian writers, as later Cyprian, do not deliberately avoid the word. They simply take care to put it in the right place.

If the Christians at Antioch coined the term with respect to the outside world, how have we to understand this use of the name? It was hardly meant as a substitute for the individual appellation of a follower of Christ. Later, some martyrs to all questions about their names, origin and status, gave one answer: *Christianus sum*. But the earliest instance of this use is, so far as I know, from 177 A.D.[34] The Apologist Justin, for example, gives his status exactly in the beginning of his work. Paul was rather proud to be a native of "no mean city." The taking of an official name by the disciples at Antioch probably means that they constituted a guild of Christ [35] or perhaps a synagogue of Chris-

Chrysostomus, says (P.G. CXXV, 953): in Antioch, πρῶτον ἐχρημάτισαν οἱ μαθηταὶ καλεῖσθαι χριστιανοί. Exactly the same wording in Ps. Oecumenius P.G. CXVIII, 192. Yet, one should perhaps recall the fact that in late Greek earlier words do take on queer new senses. See A. D. Nock on word-coinage in the Hermetic writings (Coniectanea Neotestamentica XI, 1947, 163).

[33] A. v. Harnack, Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums (4th ed. 1924), 413; Cadbury (see above n. 1).

[34] Euseb. h.e. V, 1, 20.

[35] On religious guilds see now A. D. Nock, HTR, 1936, 39.

tians, as there was, let us say, the "synagogue of the Freedmen" at Jerusalem or "that of Agrippenses" in Rome. Speaking or writing in Aramaic, the disciples probably used the same Greek name of their community, for in Talmudic writings such terms as *Augustiani* are simply transliterated.[36] Later, as the author of Acts implies, the style was adopted by other Christian groups elsewhere and became their name for the pagan world and the Roman authorities.

II

What does this new name mean? Tertullian [37] parallels it with that of Epicureans, of Platonists. But the proper name of the Palestinian teacher was Jesus, not Christus. The Christians, however, did not bear the name of the Master. They were not his "school," similar to "Bet Hillel" or "Bet Shammai," which flourished at Jerusalem in the days of the Apostles. The Christians got their appellation from "Christus," that is "the Anointed," the Messiah. For they were not disciples of a rabbi from Nazareth, but followers of the Scion of David.

Then, the formation of their name is exceptional.[38] In normal Greek the followers of Christ would be designated by an appellative with the suffix *-ειος*, like Ἐπικουρεῖοι, Ἀπολλωνεῖοι, etc.[39] The term *χριστιανοί*, on the other hand, is formed by addition of a Latin loan-suffix *-ianus*. In Latin this suffix produced proper names of the type *Marcianus* and, on the other hand, derivatives from the name of a person, which referred to his belongings, like *fundus Narcissianus*, or, by extension, to his adherents, *Ciceroniani*.[40] In Greek it became a fashion, under the Empire, to form

[36] Act. Ap. 6, 9. J. Juster, Les Juifs dans l'Empire Romain I (1914), 415. On transliteration of the word *Augustiani* cf. S. Krauss, Griechische Lehnworter im Talmud II (1899).

[37] Tert. Apol. 3: *Quid novi si aliquid disciplina de magistro cognomentum sectatoribus inducit? Nonne philosophi de auctoribus suis nuncupantur Platonici, Epicurei, Pythagorici?*

[38] For the following cf. Rev. Bibl., 1938, 10.

[39] Cf. Orig. in Math. t. XII, 11, p. 88 ed. Klostermann; *ἀλλὰ καὶ χριστοῦ μέλη ὄντες παρώνυμοι ἐχρημάτισαν χριστοί* (cor. Klostermann: Mss. *χριστιανοί*. Latin version: *secundum Christi nomen omnes qui sunt illius Christi dicuntur*). Likewise, Aramaic adjectives denoting sectarians, received endings in *-αιος* in Greek, as, e.g., Σαδδυκαῖος Jul. Lewy, Hebrew Union College Annual XIV (1939) 130.

[40] The later usage comes, probably, from the style of clients and freedmen:

proper names with this Latin suffix, such as Diogenianos.[41] As to derivatives with the same suffix, we have to distinguish between transliteration, borrowing and imitation of the Latin expression.[42]

In the first place, the Greeks sometimes simply transcribed Latin formulae. Ἀντωνειανοὶ Οὐηριανοί in an inscription of Ephesus are (*sodales*) *Antoniniani Veriani* in Rome.[43] II. Αἰλιὸς Πορκιλιανὸς ἱερεὺς Σουκινιανῶν of a Greek inscription is P. *Aelius Porcilianus, sacerdos Sucinianus* of a Latin inscription. Then,[44] some scribes, for brevity's sake, borrowed the Latin expression with reference to Roman names. The former property of Antonia (which now belonged to the Emperor) would be designated in Latin as *Antonianus* (*fundus*) and in Greek: πρότερον Ἀντωνίας. The Greek scribe sometimes shortened the Greek expression by borrowing the Latin appellation. Thence, Οὐσία Ἀντωνιανή, Γερμανικιανή in Greek papyri.[45]

The Greek, however, had native suffixes to express the idea of appurtenance. Accordingly, a Greek writer speaks of Καισάρεοι although Plutarch risks the formation Νερωνιανοί to denote freedmen and other favorites of Nero.[46] Rare, indeed, are Greek words

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Demetrius Pompeianus (Sen. de tranq. anim. 8, 6) is Demetrius, a freedman of Pompeius. The later use of the same suffix *-ianus* to form derivatives from common names, for example, *magistrianus* does not concern us here, although these words were also transcribed in Greek as μαγιστριανός. See, e.g. L. R. Palmer, A Grammar of the Post-Ptolemaic Papyri I, 1 (1946), 46

[41] See, e.g. M. Lambertz, Glotta, 1914, 149.

[42] These formations with the Latin suffix *-ianus* should not be confused with the adjective, ending on *-ανος* and derived from geographical names, mostly in Asia, like Ασιανοί, Σαρδιανοί. See W. Dittenberger, Hermes, 1907, 231.

[43] Ephesos III, p. 117. The inscription, referring to a Roman magistrate M. Nonius Macrinus, gives among his titles that of Ἀντωνεῖον Οὐριανόν. Cf., too, δῆμος Οὐλπιανῶν Ἀγχιαλέων on inscriptions and coins, etc.

[44] I.G. XIV, 1082 = Inscr. Gr. Rom. I, 143, where the Latin inscription (C.I.L. VI, 2179) is quoted.

[45] See M. Rostovtzeff, Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft im Römischen Kaiserreich II, 295. The formula Γερμανικιανὴ οὐσία already appears in a petition written 34 A.D. (P. Rylands I, 134).

[46] Dio Cassius always uses the form Καισάρεοι even when speaking of *Caesariani* of the Roman Emperors. Even Paul speaks of τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ Ναρκίσσου (Rom. 16, 11) where a Latin writer would have said *Narcissiani*. Plut. Galb. 17. Cf. Epict. IV, 5, 17. Through kindness of Prof. R. Marcus (Chicago), I could examine the list of derivatives on -ianus in C. D. Buck and W. Petersen, A Reverse Index of Greek Nouns and Adjectives (Univ. of Chicago Press, no date), p. 264. It confirms the observations I have made on material collected by myself. The Chicago list, unfortunately, is not free from mistakes. Here I note that συνεπο(ι)κιανός must be read συνεποικιακός (Ad. Wilhelm, quoted in J. and L. Robert, R.E.G. 1948, 194).

on -ianus derived from Greek nouns. As adjectives of this type, I can quote the words: *μαγιανόν* (bracelet, 23 A.D.), *Ἀτταλιανός* (garment, ca. 110 A.D.) [47] *Χαρακιαναί* (tiles, ca. 150 A.D.).[48]

The nouns of the same derivation are mostly the names of sects patterned after that of Christians in ecclesiastical literature. Independent of Christian usage are the names such as *Ἡρωδιανοί* (the Gospels), *Χαρμιδεανοί* (ca. 140 A.D.), *Σεβαζιανοί* (II c.), astrological terms, denoting persons "under the influence" of a zodiacal sign (*Σκορπιανοί*, etc.).[49] The epigraphist would be able, surely, to quote more parallels. An inscription shows how easy the formation on -ianus from a name became in the times of the Apostles. In 74 A.D. the city of Cibyra decreed to designate the foundation of a Phylagros as *κτήσεις . . . γυμνασιαρχικὰς φιλαγριανάς*.[50]

All these Greek terms, formed with the Latin suffix *-ianus*, exactly as the Latin words of the same derivation, express the idea that men or things referred to, belong to the person to whose name the suffix is added. In Greek as in Latin the suffix *-ianus* is a substitute for the possessive genitive. *Χαρακιαναί* tiles parallel the tiles *Εὐμήλου*, etc. The term *Καισαριανοί* corresponds to the

[47] P. Oxy. II, 259 (A.D. 23): *ψελίου χρισοῦ μναιαίων δύο μαγιανοῦ*. B.G.U. IV, 1065 (A.D. 97): *ψελίων μαγιανῶν*. Both texts according to the reading of U. Wilcken, Arch. für Papyrusforschung IV, 561. *Μαγιανός* cannot come from "Magic" as F. Preisigke, Wörterbuch and Palmer, op. cit., p. 46, assume, for the adjective in this case would be *μάγος μαγευτικός* or *μαγικός*. On the other hand, a note of hand for a gold bracelet will not mention whether the object serves as love-charm or not. *Μαγιανός* is a derivative from the name *Μάγας* or *Μάγνος* and refers to the manufacturer. A slave *Μαγιανός* is mentioned in an inscription of Samothrace (K. Lehmann-Hartleben, AJA, 1940, 348).

[48] These are tiles manufactured by Charax who is probably identical with Claudius Charax, the author, and benefactor at Pergamum, who lived under Antoninus Pius. See E. Groag and A. Stein, Prosopogr. Imperii Romani (2nd ed.) II, p. 189, # 831; R. Hepding, Philol. 1933, 93. "Attalianus" garment: P. Giess. 21.

[49] "Herodians" are mentioned Mc. 3,6 and 12,13 (Mth. 22,15). Cf. Rev. Bibl. 1938,7. The "synagogue of Herodians" (J-B. Frey, Corp. insc. jud. I, 173) has never existed. See A. Ferrua, Epigraphica III (1941), p. 34. On *ὁ δῆμος ὁ Χαρμιδεανῶν* see L. Robert, Études Anatoliennes (1937), p. 242. A dedication to *θεῷ ἐπηκόῳ ὑψίστῳ* ends with the mention of *θία[σος?] Σεβαζιανός*. A. B. Cook, Zeus II, 2, p. 879. For astrological terminology see Cod. astr. gr. VIII, 3, 138; VIII, 4, 191. The passages referred to are ascribed in Mss. to an Antiochus and an Harpocration. On these authors cf. F. Cumont, Melanges Bidez (1934) p. 134; A-J. Festugière, La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste (1944).

[50] I.G.R. IV, 915. On Philagrus cf. L. Robert, o.c.p. 375. I am unable to understand Inschr. v. Magnesia, 309: a woman is styled as *ὑπότροφος θεῶν προαστιανῶν*. I suspect the reading.

ellipse Καίσαρος (*Caesaris servus*) in other documents. The "Christians" belong to Christ, they are οἱ τοῦ χριστοῦ as Paul says.[51] Consequently, to understand their name. we have first to be clear about Jesus' title. Now, "Christus" is, of course, a literal, and for this reason, untintelligible, rendering of the Hebrew *Mashiah* (Aramaic: *Meshiah*), meaning "Anointed," a word, which, in turn, is an adjective referring to the king of the race of David who will redeem and restore Israel. In other words, it is a royal title, and the name "Christians" means *ministri regis*.

One may object, perhaps, that the corresponding Semitic expression (which would have been *abdei ha mashiah* in Hebrew) does not occur in our sources. But in the Hebrew Bible, where the solemn appellation "Anointed" always has a defining genitive or adjective referring to the Lord, the word has no separate existence or political meaning. King as ruler is called here *melek*. Only in the use of later Jews "the Anointed" became the title of the ruler of a redeemed and regenerated Israel. The Jews, however, expected the Messiah in an indefinite future, so they had no occasion to deal with the courtiers of a prince who would not come before the end of the world. For the Christians, on the other hand, the Messiah was already here. Jesus' message announced: "the Time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand" (Mc. 1, 15). Accordingly, "the Messiah" as a technical term, appears for the first time, in Greek garb (ὁ χριστός), in the Gospels. Thus, differing from official Judaism, the believers in Jesus the Anointed had to deal with the officers of this king.

If we want to make the meaning precise of the term "Christians," we have again to go behind the Greek façade. As often in the New Testament, the lexical form is Greek while the idea is Jewish. The writers of the New Testament often mention Christ's slaves. Now, the word δοῦλος may have many meanings. For instance I Cor. 7, 22–4, Paul uses the term and the Greek practice of the παραμονή to express the idea of the religious equalitarianism in Christ.[52] Likewise, the term is often used as a

[51] A. Deissmann, Light from the Ancient East (1927), 377 has already seen that relationship. The genitive χριστοῦ: I Cor. 1, 12; 3, 23; 15, 23; II Cor. 10, 7; Gal. 3, 29; 5, 24.

[52] W. L. Westermann, Proceed. Amer. Philosophical Society, XCII (1948) 55.

figure of speech: "Slaves of Sin" (Rom. 6, 17), etc. Then, of course, the word δοῦλος often appears in the New Testament to designate the slaves in the sense of civil law. Leaving out this normal Greek usage and (also normal Greek) metaphors, there remains in the New Testament a residue, where the word δοῦλος is employed in meanings which are completely foreign to the Greek. Nurtured in the Septuagint, Paul and other apostles use the term as an equivalent of the Hebrew *ebed*. *Ebed*, of course, means δοῦλος (although the Septuagint for this meaning rather put παῖς [53]), but, then, in Hebrew, (as corresponding terms in other Oriental languages), the word had taken on the significance of "subject." "All the slaves" of the Pharaoh means all his subjects (Dt. 29, 1). It was a principle of the Jews and a title of honor for them that they were subjects (literally slaves) of God alone.[54] When Jesus promises the Jews that the Truth will make them free, they answer indignantly: "We are Abraam's seed and never were subject to anyone" (Jo. 8, 33). On the other hand, the same word *ebed* (and again corresponding terms in other Oriental languages) eventually acquired the meaning, depending on the context, of royal officer or agent. For instance, *Ya' azanyahn ebhedh ha(m)melech* on a seal means literally: Jaazaniah, slave of the king. He was, of course, not a slave, but a royal officer, mentioned in the Bible.[55] In Xenophon's Anabasis, a Persian is quoted as calling Cyrus the Younger "slave" (δοῦλος) of the Great King.[56] Darius I addresses his letter to his governor Gadatas as follows: Darius "thus says to Gadatas, slave." [57] Now, the Septuagint, as a rule, employs the word δοῦλος to express in Greek both these peculiar significations of *ebed*. As the passages just quoted from Xenophon and Darius' letter show, the

[53] Cf. K. H. Rengstorf, in Theol. Worterbuch II, 269.

[54] See, e.g., G. F. Moore, Judaism II (1927) 372; J. Bonsirven, Le Judaisme Palestinien I (1935), 83; S. Schechter, Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology (1909) 85. On God as king of his people and the worshipper as servant see W. R. Smith, Lectures on the Religion of the Semites (3d ed. 1927), 62 ff. Smith, of course, notices that *ebed* may mean "courtier." See also W. Baudissin, Kyrios, III (1929), 555 ff.

[55] Ch. McCown, Tell-en-Nasbeh I (1947) 163. I reproduce the transcription of the editor. Cf. II Reg. 25, 23; Jer. 40, 8.

[56] Xen., Anab., II, 6, 38. Cf. ib., I, 9, 29.

[57] Ch. Michel, Recueil d'inscr. grecques, 32: *βασιλεὺς βασιλέων Δαρεῖος ὁ Ὑστάσπεω Γαδάται δούλωι τάδε λέγει.*

Alexandrian translators, as often, followed the pattern of Persian official interpreters. Through the Septuagint, the eventual equation of δοῦλοι with *ministri* or *subditi* became customary to the New Testament writers. They often speak of God's or Christ's "slaves" (δοῦλοι) meaning *ministri Dei* or *subjecti Dei.*

Since the Messiah, according to Jewish thought, was God's vicar on the earth until the consummation of his task, the New Testament writers often describe divine operations in terms either of God or of Christ. For Paul the tribunal of God is identical with the tribunal of the Messiah.[58] Nevertheless, with reference to the Messiah, the word δοῦλοι signifies in one instance only the "subjects," and even in this case I am not sure that this interpretation is necessary.[59] It is the passage in Apoc. 2, 18–20 where "the Son of God" speaks of Jezebel who has seduced τοὺς ἐμοὺς δούλους. The reason for this aversion is that the Jews, as I have said, being subjects of God, were never regarded as "slaves" of the Messiah, who was only God's representative and envoy. For the same reason, the formula "slave of God" rarely means God's subject in the New Testament. For since all Jews were God's subjects, there was no use of making a point of it. When Mary answers to the angel that she is "slave of the Lord" (Lc. 1, 38), that is simply a formula of politeness, which is, by the way, again non-Greek. When Paul says that the free man who is called is the "slave of Christ" (I Cor. 7, 22–4), he uses not only the non-Greek, but also non-Jewish concept of free persons who became self-devotees of an Oriental divinity.[60] But in the vision of the King of Kings and Lord of Lords in the Revelation, when God avenges the blood of His "slaves" at the hand of the great Babylon, the word clearly refers to all believers (Apoc. 19, 2 and 5 with 18, 24).[61]

In most cases, when δοῦλος is a transposition of *ebed*, the

[58] Rom. 14, 10 and II Cor. 5, 10. See A. D. Nock, St. Paul (1938) 79.

[59] Eph. 6, 6 is another passage where the noun may have the same meaning. I leave out the usage of the verb δουλεύειν which already in classical Greek eventually took on the metaphorical meaning. See e.g. Rom. 16, 18: they who serve (δουλεύουσιν) not Christ, but their own belly. But in Rom. 14, 18 or Coloss. 3, 23 the verb may express the idea of subjection to the Messiah.

[60] See Westermann, op. cit. 63.

[61] See, too, Act. Apost. 4, 23; I Pet. 2, 16; Apoc. 1, 1.

meaning is *minister*.[62] That is clear when the texts refer to God's "slaves," the prophets,[63] or Moses, "the slave of God" (Apoc. 15, 3), or when a writer of a message to the faithful styles himself "a slave of Jesus Christ called to be his envoy." [64] That conveys the meaning of the formula: "slave of Jesus the Messiah" [65] or "slave of God and of Jesus the Messiah" [66] or "slave of God" [67] with reference to Paul, or the other apostles or to their co-workers. When Paul says: if I pleased men, I should not be the "slave" of Christ (Gal. 1, 10), the meaning is, I should not be an agent of the Messiah.[68] When writing to Colossians, he introduces Epaphras, a man from the church at Colosse, as a "slave of Christ" who prays for his community (Col. 4, 12), that would have no meaning if Epaphras were not recommended here as an officer of the King Messiah. This interpretation of the usage is directly confirmed by parallel passages where the writers have recourse to genuine Greek terms. In I Cor. 4, 1; II, Cor. 6, 4 Paul speaks of "us, the ministers of Christ" (or of God): *ὑπηρέτας Χριστοῦ θεοῦ διάκονοι*).[69] In II Cor. 11, 23, he styles himself (and other apostles): *διάκονοι Χριστοῦ*. In Colossians (1, 7) the same Epaphras is designated as *σύνδουλος ἡμῶν . . . διάκονος τοῦ Χριστοῦ*. Timotheus is "the slave of the Lord" (I Tim. 2, 24) and "minister of God": or of Jesus Christ (I Thess. 3, 2; I Tim. 4, 6): *δοῦλος Κυρίου, διάκονος τοῦ θεοῦ, διάκονος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ*.

For, being the "Anointed" King, Jesus has to have his retinue, his officers in the new age, which was already here, of the King-

[62] After having written these pages, I found that K. Holl, Gesamm. Aufsätze II (1928) 107 had already pointed out that in Paul the term "slave of Christ" is a title, which a common Christian does not have. I do not recall ever seeing the relationship between this Pauline usage, the Septuagint and the Oriental style clearly put, but I did not read all the modern literature on Paul. I could not learn anything from the latest paper on the subject (G. Sass, Zeitschr. Neutest. Wiss. 1941, 24–32).

[63] Apoc. 10, 7; 11, 18; 22, 6. Cf. Act. Ap. 4, 29; 16, 17.

[64] Rom. 1, 1; Tit. 1, 1; II Pet. 1, 1.

[65] Phil. 1, 1; Col. 4, 12; II Tim. 2, 24; Juda 1, 1.

[66] James 1, 1.

[67] Tit. 1, 1.

[68] Cf. Act. Ap. 20, 19.

[69] Cf. Rom. 13, 4: the secular ruler is *θεοῦ διάκονος*. Jo. 18, 36: Speaking of his "kingdom" Jesus calls his disciples: *οἱ ὑπηρέται . . . οἱ ἐμοί*. Cf. also Lc. 1, 2; Act. Ap. 26, 16: Paul called by Jesus to be *ὑπηρέτην καὶ μάρτυρα*. Col. I, 25: Paul *διάκονος* of the Ecclesia which is Christ's body.

dom of Heaven.[70] Josephus tells us that the Pharisees promised to a eunuch of Herod, that he will not only receive his manliness, but also the court rank of "father and benefactor" from "him who was according to their predictions to be their king." [71] When the sons of Zebedee asked for privileged seats in Jesus' glory, they wanted to become high courtiers of the messianic king. The narrator adds that other apostles were jealous of this request. The question of the apostles as to who is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven has the same earthy meaning.[72]

At Antioch, the common believer received his place and function in the messianic hierarchy. They became "slaves of God," who were chosen and "sealed" from all the tribes of Israel (Apoc. 7, 3). That, of course, did not make everybody equal to Paul or Barnabas. "There are diversities of grace . . . diversities of ministration" (I Cor. 12, 4).

To express this relationship between the Messiah and his elect, the disciples at Antioch, speaking to the pagan world, could not style themselves: "slaves of Christ." For, to a Greek ear, "James, slave of God and Lord Jesus Christ" would resound exactly as Κόρραγος δοῦλος τοῦ Σαράπιος καὶ Ἴσιος.[73] But the followers of Christ were no hierodules. Neither could they assume an appellation similar to Ἰσιακοί, Σαραπιασταί. For that would have suggested the blasphemous idea that they adored the Messiah as their God. The term χριστιανοί on the other hand, made it clear that they were agents, representatives of the Messiah. Augustine's rhetorical antithesis put it expressively: *unus Christus et multi Christi.*[74]

The name which the followers of Jesus gave themselves offi-

[70] On this concept see, e.g., C. H. Dodd, The Apostolic Preaching (1936), 66 ff. C. C. Torrey, in Quantulacumque . . . presented to K. Lake (1937) p. 317 points out that in the Gospels the term "Christ" is always either the descriptive adjective or the title, but never the proper name.

[71] Jos., Antt. XVII, 45.

[72] Mth. 20, 20 (Mc. 10, 35); Mth. 18, 1. Cf. Apoc. 5, 10. Cf. P. Volz, Die Eschatalogie der jüdischen Gemeinde (1934) 404.

[73] L. Robert, Rev. Arch. 1933, 140.

[74] If I am not mistaken, I found the expression in Augustine's Enarrationes in Psalmos, but at present I am unable to supply the reference. The idea, however, often occurs in patristic writings. See, e.g. Origen's passage quoted above n. 39; Methodius, Conviv. VIII, 8 or Rufin's rendering of Pamphilus' Apology for Origen, 5 (P.G. XVII, 588): *ab uno enim Christo multi fiunt Christi.*

cially at Antioch, about 40 A.D., is a precious relic which has survived from the short and obscure period between Jesus and Paul, whose preserved letters start a decade later. The name shows that at this date, in the first decade after the end and glory of Jesus, his followers continued to think of him according to Jewish patterns of thought. They were still a Jewish movement, who believed themselves to be the "third order" [75] called to enter the Kingdom of Heaven, and who, as such, declared to the pagan world that they were officers of the Anointed King in his kingdom, which was a present reality. "The darkness is passing and the real light is already shining" (I Jo. 2, 9).

[75] On the meaning and origins of the term *tertium genus hominum* see L. Baeck, in Jewish Studies in memory G. A. Kohut (1935) 41.

EASTERN AND WESTERN LITURGIES: THE PRIMITIVE BASIS OF THEIR LATER DIFFERENCES

A Note for the Study of Eucharistic Origins

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The differences between the developed liturgies of East and West appear at first sight to be matters of purely ecclesiological interest, but more closely examined they are found to shed light on primitive Christian practice and on the growth of the text of the New Testament. The differences themselves are commonly stated thus: [1]

(1) In the recital of institution as concerns the bread, the West follows more closely the form of Matthew and Mark, the East that of Paul and Luke;

(2) After the recital of institution the West deems consecration to have been effected, while the East requires that an invocation of the Holy Spirit yet be pronounced.

The second of these statements is accurate; but the first is of too general a nature and conceals divergences far more radical than an appeal to slightly different texts. Moreover there is another important difference between the liturgies:

(3) The West has inherited the idea of gift-sacrifice, the East that of communion-sacrifice.

It is worth while to examine these differences in some detail and to trace if possible the history of their development.

1(a). The recitals of institution as a whole, in the developed liturgies of both East and West, purport to describe the actions and the words of Jesus at the Last Supper; and interest centres on differences in the words said to have been spoken over the bread. In the Roman Canon, both in its Gregorian and Gelasian forms, we read "This is my body"; and this wording, which is that of both Matthew and Mark, is supported by the so-called "Ambrosian" rite, by the treatise de Mysteriis and, much earlier,

[1] Cf. e.g. E. Bishop, Observations on the Liturgy of Narsai (Texts and Studies, viii.1.145).

by Justin Martyr. On the other hand, the treatise de Sacramentis and the liturgy of the Roman (?) schismatic Hippolytus add "which is broken for many (you)"; and this form of recital, although we shall see that it is typically Eastern, is matched by some similarly reflective and explanatory language both in the prayers of the later Roman rite itself and in the writings of the Western Fathers. For this reason, some have assumed that the later Roman rite represents a revision of Western rites whose early form did not differ materially from those of the East. But this is too ready an assumption; it overlooks the significance of the divergence between the two forms of bread-recital and does not explain why they mingled in the West for, possibly, the first six centuries. A more likely hypothesis is that there existed from early times (exactly how early will be suggested in due course) a Western type of rite upon which Eastern influences were for long allowed to exercise an unchecked influence. If so, the final adoption of one form of bread-recital, "This is my body," marked in the West a reversion to type. Now this type is quite insufficiently explained by the traditional statement that "the West follows more closely Matthew and Mark"; for, in the first place, it follows them exactly, and in the second place it must do more than merely copy a text common to both these Gospels. An organic relationship of this form of bread-recital with a particular interpretation of the Last Supper is indicated, and it is important for us to know precisely whence that interpretation derives. For the moment, however, we only note that of these two Gospels Mark's alone can be of Western origin; the question of a possible relationship between the Western rite and a particular Gospel is one that will arise again as we consider the other distinguishing features of the West. But first it will be more convenient to examine the characteristic Eastern bread-recital, the evidence for which is fuller and the theological implications of which are more easily discerned.

1(b). Apart from unimportant differences, all fully developed Eastern liturgies — whether Syrian, Egyptian or later Syro-Byzantine — read "This is my body which is broken for you for remission of sins": to which most Syriac liturgies add "and life eternal."

If then it be said, as in the statement of Eastern and Western differences given in the first paragraph of this essay, that there is agreement between the Eastern bread-recital and the wording of Paul and Luke, this agreement is plainly of a very general nature only. Even as regards the first section of the bread-recital — "This is my body which is broken for you" — the word "broken" is not properly attested in either Paul or Luke. The longer text of Luke (xx.19b) reads not "broken" but "given," while the shorter and no doubt more original Lucan text omits all the words after "body." For the wording of Paul, i.e. of I Cor. xi. 24, the evidence is divided. The consensus of the old Latin supports "broken" but the word does not appear to have been included in the old Syriac, whilst the main Greek MSS likewise omit this, or any cognate, word; so that we must conclude that the authentic reading of I Cor. xi. 24 is "This is my body which is for you." Therefore, as regards the word "broken," which is the crux of the liturgical recital, the East cannot be said to follow the genuine text of either Luke or I Cor. xi. 24.

Whence then is the authority for this word derived? And whence derives the authority for the other expressions in the Eastern bread-recital? The most probable answer is that it derives from what the East calls "Holy Tradition." Lietzmann has already shown with great clearness, in chapter ii of Messe und Herrenmahl, that the characteristic feature of Eastern recitals as a whole is their divergence from Biblical texts, due to the pressure of liturgical and doctrinal traditions; e.g., after the fashion of the celebrant, Jesus himself is said to have "shown" the bread to God and to have mingled the chalice at the Last Supper. Similar influences may be expected to have shaped the actual bread and wine recitals; and this is manifestly so as regards the final words, "for life eternal," which form no part of any New Testament account of the institution of the eucharist. This expression is part of the earliest language of the Church on the fruits of union with Christ; it occurs, for example, in John vi, in the prayers of the Didache and those of other liturgies; but it only enters the recitals of institution under the influence of a particular development in traditional Eastern eucharistic theology. Thus: in the liturgical homilies of Narsai of Edessa and Nisibis (c. 437 A.D.),

the elements are said to be transformed, by consecration, from the dead into the risen body of Christ; after which, continues Narsai, "the priest begins to break the body of Christ (that sits in glory) . . . and to distribute." [2] As a result of such teaching, both the bread and wine recitals of many Syriac liturgies were expanded by the words "for life eternal." It should be noted however that the teaching expresses itself primarily in relation to the bread. "Break the body . . . and distribute" (even though the body include the blood) assumes that bread, and the breaking of it, provided the primary symbols; and nowhere in this liturgy are these words supplemented by a separate elucidation of the symbolism of the wine in relation to eternal life.[3]

A similar tradition, centring on the breaking of bread, appears also to have governed the introduction of the phrase "for remission of sins" into the Eastern recitals of institution. Its earliest undisputed appearance is in the bread and wine recitals of the fourth century Apostolic Constitutions viii; yet the phrase appears in the New Testament (Matthew only) in relation to the bread alone. Moreover the bread-recital of this liturgy is linked with the words "This is the mystery of the New Covenant," words which the Gospel again links with the cup alone; and this time, they are not even repeated in the cup-recital of the liturgy. Nothing but a strong tradition as to the primacy of the bread can account for so startling a divergence from the Gospel. A study of the sources of Apostolic Constitutions viii confirms the conclusion that "for remission of sins" cannot merely have been assimilated to the bread-recital by parallelism with the cup-recital. One of these sources is the liturgy of Hippolytus, whose bread-recital we have already noted to be Eastern in its form of "This is my body which is broken for you." We now observe that some MSS add "for remission of sins," but that they make no similar addition to the cup-recital. If this expansion of the bread-recital be part of the original text, we get a very early date for the de-

[2] Texts and Studies viii (ed. R. H. Connolly), pp. 4, 22, 29.

[3] In a subsequent passage Narsai uses the phrase "medicine of immortality" to include both the bread and the wine, when it could so well have been reserved for the wine alone. It is interesting that the logos-epiclesis of Sarapion does exactly the same. Can this be explained except by the hypothesis that the wine was traditionally regarded as subsidiary?

velopment; if it be not original, then its witness to the centrality of the broken bread at the later date when, in this case, the words will have been inserted in the Eastern MSS only, is even more remarkable.[4] The other source of Apostolic Constitutions is an earlier form of the Antiochene rite, and although this form is only conjectural, it is considered to have resembled that of Addai and Mari (see p. 142), which in turn invites comparison with the rite of the Didache, whose stress on the breaking of bread is undisputed.

Only a most tentative conjecture can be made as to the kind of way in which "remission of sins" first entered the Eastern bread-recital. I have shown elsewhere, with reference to the Didache, that although its Supper-rite is not based on a command held to have been given by Jesus, it may, nevertheless, look to the Last Supper [5] as the occasion of the founding of a Covenant under which the worshippers held themselves, at least at the moment of communion, to be free of sin. If this be so, then it would be natural for the thought to find expression in the eucharistic prayer at that point in the development of the rite when the broken bread which is its central feature had come to be regarded as setting forth Christ's death. The fact that the New Covenant, set up at the Last Supper for the remission of sins, had been related by Matthew to the cup, would create no great difficulty in the Church of the Didache, for the Didache itself, whilst appearing to know Matthew better than any other Gospel, uses it in general with freedom. Hence the association of the New Covenant for remission of sins with the bread in all those Churches

[4] The combination of Eastern and Western elements in Hippolytus has not received sufficient attention; nor has that in Justin, of whose eucharistia the liturgy of Hippolytus may well be a formalized expression. Justin was a native of the East who came under the influence of Rome; Hippolytus was apparently of Roman birth, but his teacher, Irenaeus, had been a disciple of Polycarp; and this mixture of influences is proportionately reflected in their rites. See infra, p. 132 concerning Justin's rite. In that of Hippolytus, the central and controlling position given to the words of institution is a definitely Western trait; and because they acquired that position early in the West, their expansion from the brief "This is my body," even though made under Eastern influences, could take place earlier than in the East itself, where the recital of institution seems for long to have formed no essential part of the eucharistia. See pp. 141.

[5] In the English edition of Lietzmann's Messe und Herrenmahl, by D. H. G. Reeve and R. D. Richardson. Cf. A. D. Nock in The Trinity and The Incarnation, ed. J. A. Rawlinson, p. 130.

whose liturgies appear to have a root in the Didache or in a primitive type of similar nature to that of the Didache.

Of earlier inclusion in the Eastern bread-recital than the two phrases already discussed is the word "broken." We have seen already that it has no place in any Biblical words attributed to Jesus at the Last Supper, so that we must conclude that it too originated in a tradition that centred on the actual breaking of bread. How important was the broken bread, κλάσμα, is clear both from the rite of the Didache and also from that of Hippolytus. And the latter not only uses this word of the fragments distributed in communion, but accompanies these alone (as does the later liturgy of Narsai already mentioned) by proper words of administration: "The Bread of Heaven in Christ Jesus." [6] This word κλάσμα appears in the Gospels only in the story of the Feeding of the Five Thousand, and it provides a further example of the way in which all traditions relevant to the eucharist were incorporated in the final form of the Eastern bread-recitals. In these, the word took its participial form, κλώμενον, as qualifying ἄρτον.

There remain the final words only, "This is my body," the original nucleus of the bread-recital. The whole of the earliest evidence for the Eastern rite — as represented, that is, by the shorter text of Luke, Acts, Didache and perhaps the Ignatian epistles [7] — shows that it was an act of spiritual fellowship. Only Luke and I Cor. x, of course, use the actual phrase "body of Christ," but in all alike the bread was broken and distributed as a symbol of the union that is in Christ. No doubt it had this significance when Jesus broke bread with his disciples in Galilee; and "body of Christ" in this sense is also an integral part of

[6] The words for the cups of water, milk and wine in the Paschal eucharist here described have no closeness to the thing signified and are plainly secondary. They consist merely in a Trinitarian formula (to which is added a mention of the Church) spread over the administration of each cup thrice: "In God the Father Almighty; And in the Lord Jesus Christ; And in (the) Holy Spirit (and) in the Holy Church." Cf. Ed. G. Dix, p. 42.

[7] Ignatius of course stresses not only the union of Christians but also their need of ecclesiastical unity; yet when he turns to the "sacrifice of the altar" in support of it, his appeal is based chiefly on the broken bread: "breaking one bread" etc. He refers only once to the cup in this connection. Cf. ad Ephes. v, xx, ad Phil. iv.2. This is particularly interesting if the letters are not genuine, but belong to the middle of the second century.

Pauline thought.[8] But the phrase does not bear this meaning in Mark and I Cor. xi, so that "This is my body" cannot have entered the Eastern liturgy in the first place under the influence of these interpretations of the Last Supper.

There is then more than a presumption, arising from an examination both of the New Testament texts and of the distinctively Eastern bread-words themselves, that the form of the latter was shaped in the course of liturgical practice and under the influence of doctrinal developments, and that the words were not taken in the first place from Gospel and Pauline texts concerning the Last Supper. St. Basil says that some of "the words of invocation at the consecration" come from what "the Apostle or the Gospel" mention, whilst "other things" which "we utter both before and after" come from "the unwritten instruction."[9] And this is true; expressions from the New Testament accounts of the Last Supper did, inevitably, enter the Eastern "Invocation" — which here means the whole central part of the anaphora and not merely the epiclesis — but it is the Tradition which dominates and which even bends the New Testament words to its own peculiar use; not even the Pauline anamnesis is actually quoted — save in some of the latest and most developed liturgies — but it is utilized and expanded as part of a liturgical form: "Remembering therefore . . ." (the passion, tomb, resurrection, ascension, session at the Right Hand and the coming to judgment, — these are added one by one). Working backwards through all these developments, it seems legitimate to conclude that the heart of the governing tradition was that Jesus broke bread, at the Last Supper, as on other, earlier occasions. Subsequently — as the symbolism of that central act was drawn out, religiously, doctrinally and liturgically, and stage by stage — the Eastern recital of institution acquired its wording and finally its place as a separate section of the eucharistia.

2(a). With regard to the second point of difference between the developed Eastern and Western liturgies, i.e. the moment when consecration is deemed to have been effected, the late, dis-

[8] Rom. xii. 4f, I Cor. xii. 12ff, Ephes. iv. 4ff.
[9] de Spiritu Sancto xxvii.2.

tinctively Roman witnesses already quoted for the wording of the bread-recital evidently fix it as that in which the words have been pronounced. De Sacramentis also, this time, supports the Roman view: "When the time comes for consecrating the venerable sacrament, the priest no longer uses his own words but the words of Christ. So then the word of Christ consecrates this sacrament." [10]

A similar point of view is to be found among earlier representatives of the West, although not so plainly stated. But of course a clear-cut theory of consecration and, in particular, of a specific moment of consecration, had not yet been worked out. It is therefore not surprising to find that there also exist unmistakable signs of the influence of Eastern consecratory theories upon the early Western witnesses. The Eastern view, broadly, is that the bread and wine are offered to God as likenesses, antitypes or symbols of the body and blood of Christ, and that they need some outpouring of the Divine to effect their consecration. Thus, in addition to the authorities already quoted for the definite Roman view, we find also the following divided evidence. Fulgentius, in the early sixth century, says that "the Holy Spirit is asked for from the Father in order that the sacrifice may be consecrated." [11] Earlier, Augustine says that "the word impinges upon (accedit ad) the element and behold! (fit) a sacrament." [12] Still earlier, Cyprian both uses symbolic language, such as that the blood of Christ is "shown forth" (ostenditur) in the cup, and also says that Christ offered to God bread and wine, "that is, his body and blood." [13] Tertullian uses very similar language.[14] Hippolytus both makes words of institution central in his liturgy and subsequently (Latin and Ethiopic MSS) invokes the Holy Spirit.[15] Optatus [16] and Justin [17] use the characteristic Roman

[10] iv.4.14.
[11] ad Monimum ii.7.
[12] in Ioann. Tract lxxx.3.
[13] Ep. lxii.2.
[14] adv. Marc. iii.51, iv.220, v.255.
[15] Apost. Trad. (ed. Dix) xxiii.1, iv.9.
[16] c. Donat. vi.1.2.
[17] Just. I Apol. lxvi. The passage is difficult to interpret, the argument itself being confused, but the tendency to translate *τὴν δι' εὐχῆς λόγου τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῦ* by "the word of prayer that proceeded from him," i.e. the words of institution,

bread-words, "This is my body," but also language which approaches an epiclesis, of Holy Spirit type and Logos type respectively.

We are evidently confronted by a variety of evidence similar to that which exists in regard to the Western bread-recital. And once again it is fairly clear that the distinctively Western type has not been superimposed upon an earlier Eastern type but is native to the West, Eastern influences mingling freely with it only during an interim period. We shall see that the East, on the other hand, had from the beginning a clear and consistent principle of eucharistic thought, and that this governed logically all developments, whereas Western ideas were at first only adumbrated and contingent, without obvious necessity in a basis of experience and thought; it is as if the West had its own character and was true to it instinctively, but did not yet know itself fully or what was properly inconsistent with it. We must therefore seek to discover how and when the West received the imprint of which it ultimately became fully conscious and to which thereafter it remained entirely faithful. And a long drawn-out dispute, of very early origin, between East and West appears to disclose the evidence that we need — the Paschal controversy.

The Paschal controversy emerged into the clear light of Church history with the visit which Polycarp of Smyrna is said to have paid to Anicetus of Rome in the year 154 A.D. Anicetus could not persuade Polycarp to abandon the observance of a Christian Passover on the 14th Nisan, the essence of the Eastern position being the traditional observance of Passover rituals and datings interpreted in terms of the redemption wrought by Christ. A fast, of shorter or longer duration, reached its climax of mourning for Christ's crucifixion during the time of the sacrifice of the Passover lambs; and this fast was followed, the same night, by a festival supper at which it would seem that a lamb or sheep was eaten.[18] In the West, however, it was held that Jewish ceremonies

seems too modern in its implications and, philosophically speaking, anachronistic. Justin is steeped in the Logos theology and chooses this expression because it furnishes some parallel with the Incarnation. Irenaeus has strong links with Justin and a definite logos-epiclesis; adv. Haer. v.ii.3.

[18] Epiph. Haer. l. 3 etc. Cf. J. Drummond, The Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel, ch.viii, for a full discussion and references.

and seasons had been done away in Christ; and, although an anniversary commemoration of the redemption wrought by Christ was observed, the fast was prolonged until the Lord's Day following the 14th Nisan, when naturally the celebrations had their consummation in the Lord's Day eucharist.

Now it was from the Gospel of Mark, and from Mark only,[19] that this Western attitude to the Jewish Passover received its direct warrant, for in his Gospel he interprets the Last Supper, with its use of bread and wine and absence of Passover dishes, as a *substitute* for the Passover; the old Covenant made through Moses was then abolished and another Covenant was set up through the prefigured sacrifice of Christ. This Covenant Supper itself could not, in the nature of things, be repeated, and it is significant that the annual observances described above were in no sense a commemoration of the institution of the eucharist. But the Lord's Day eucharist, which, in the West, marked the end of the annual mourning for Christ's death and the beginning of thanksgiving for his resurrection, inevitably took on the character of the sacrificial Supper which was held by Mark to have abolished the Old, and set up the New, Dispensation; [20] and we can see that sooner or later this character must also have affected the weekly Western Supper rite. The earliest evidence that it was beginning to do so appears at the turn of the first century, when the Fourth Gospel silently combats the Marcan interpretation by giving a different account of the Last Supper and by relating its eucharistic teaching to the needs of the hungry soul

[19] We now see that the Roman bread-recital cannot have its source in Matthew, for this, Eastern, Gospel attempts to weaken Mark's interpretation in favor of the Eastern view of the Passover; Mk. xiv.12 cf. Mt. xxvi.17; Mk. xiv.14 cf. Mt. xxvi.18.

[20] We see this clearly in later times, when the evidence is fuller; and it seems likely that the eating of a lamb in early times in the West, as well as in the East, but during the Sunday of the Pascha, and sometime after communion, was gradually brought more closely into conjunction with the eucharist itself. In the 9th century, East charged West with sacrificing a lamb, together with the Lord's body, upon the altar; certainly a lamb was offered in some way. Later, it was eaten, roasted, by the Pope and eleven Cardinals "in figure of" the Last Supper. Finally, the eating of the lamb was replaced by distributing wax cakes in the form of a lamb, a custom continued to modern times. Cf. the old Ordo Romanus (Mabillon, Museum Italicum, Luteciae-Parisiorum, 1689, t.ii, p. 142); Bingham Ant. xv.2.3; E. Hatch, Hibbert Lectures 1888, pp. 296ff; DACL. Art. Agneau Pascal; J. Drummond, op. cit., pp. 455ff.

instead of to the thought of the Christian Covenant. Further, by placing his teaching in the setting of the Feeding of a Multitude in Galilee *at the time* of the Passover *previous* to the Last Supper, John seems to signify that a rite in which the breaking of bread [21] was the principal feature is a spiritual *counterpart* to the Passover and does not abolish the Passover itself.[22]

This divergency between Mark and John could hardly have been the subject of vital controversy at the time when the Fourth Gospel was written if a rite similar to that of Mark's Last Supper had existed since Christ's death. And if we put aside all presuppositions (based on I Cor.xi alone) as to what the Christian Supper must have been from the beginning, we shall see how much other evidence agrees with the conclusion that Mark's interpretation was only just beginning, at the end of the first century, to stamp itself upon the West. Thus neither the Epistle to the Hebrews, which develops the Marcan idea of the Covenant sacrifice of Jesus and is most probably of Roman antecedents, nor the Epistle of Clement of Rome, which is dependent on Hebrews, provides any warrant for supposing that there yet existed a regular rite which was held to have been formally instituted at the Last Supper. Moreover Justin Martyr, who, towards the middle of the second century, is our first witness for an actual Roman rite, still expounds the weekly eucharist on basically Eastern lines, and only reinforces his teaching at the end by quoting bread and wine recitals based on Mark. How much longer this two-fold influence continued in the West we have already seen. Yet Mark's interpretation of the Last Supper, with all its creativeness and originality — though we must never forget that it was an interpretation — gradually subordinated to itself, once it had been received by the West, all other elements in the weekly Supper. Accordingly, by the time we come to Hippolytus, we find that the rite has been made to hinge upon its formal institu-

[21] It should be noted that the bread distributed to the multitude and the manna bestowed in the wilderness are the sole types of the Bread of Heaven throughout John vi. Only towards the end, in four consecutive verses (which, incidentally, are otherwise repetitive) is there any reference to drinking Christ's blood; while the blood and the flesh together stand for the one Christ, who is still typified by bread only. There is no mention of wine in this sacramental discourse.

[22] Cf. B. W. Bacon, The Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate, ch. xiv.

tion at the Last Supper and that it is steeped in Paschal thoughts.[23] A little later, Cyprian is the first to speak definitely of the eucharistic sacrifice in terms of the propitiatory sacrifice upon the Cross.[24] And all the time, the appeal to the Last Supper as having set up a duly-instituted Prototype carries with it the implication that by its re-enactment alone the bread and wine are consecrated. So we advance to the period when the Roman Church began to formulate systematically its eucharistic theology. Then, the stark realism of the words "This is my body," and the idea of a specific moment in which "conversion" of the sacrifice was effected, invited one another and made their indissoluble union in the clear-cut Latin mind. Bread-recital, view of consecration and view of sacrifice all have their source in Mark; there is an organic relationship between them. Other elements in the Roman Canon are survivals from the period of close contact with the Eastern symbolic view.

2(b). The Eastern view of consecration as effected by an invoked outpouring of the Divine is more fully traceable through the stages of its gradual development; and we find that like the Eastern bread-recital it is part of a complex of ideas that sprang up round the breaking of bread, not round a given formula of institution.

Thus, in the Synoptic accounts of the Feeding of the Multitudes, when Jesus breaks the loaves he lifts his eyes to heaven — no doubt, in the view of those amongst whom the accounts circulated — to invoke the supernatural power by which the bread should not fail for the sustenance of so many. It is not that this touch of magico-sacramentalism enters into the Gospels themselves; we mention it here because the look of Jesus, connected only with the breaking of bread for the multitudes, became a feature of the later eucharistia, in which it was balanced by God's answering look upon the offering and the interpretation of this look in terms of the descent, outpouring, etc. of the Holy Spirit.[25] In the Johannine account of the Feeding the upward look of Jesus is omitted, because the writer's view of him is that he already

[23] Cf. G. Dix, The Apostolic Tradition, pp. 74f.
[24] Cf. J. H. Srawley, The Early History of the Liturgy, pp. 133, 227.
[25] Cf. A.C. viii and its later Syro-Byzantine developments.

"is in heaven" [26] and is himself the Bread Eternal. And this led on to a variant sacramental theory, in which the broken bread of the Supper was regarded as itself endowed with the virtue of its Prototype, the Eternal Bread or divine Logos.

The first hint of these consecratory theories in a table-rite appears in I Cor.x.16–21. Here, a broken and divided loaf provides the essential symbolism of a corporate community, "the body of Christ," which the mystical Christ indwells; but the later verses of the section, in drawing a parallel between the Christian rite and Jewish or heathen sacrifices, carry the connotation that communion with God or demon is effected by the partaking of food which has been blessed. The argument is no doubt *ad hominem* and does not yet express a thought-out *ex opere operato* view.

The ideas of I Cor.x reappear in the rite of the Didache, most probably assigned to a region not far from Antioch. But here it is the "Name," or nature, of God that comes to dwell in the hearts of the "holy" through their partaking of the wine and "broken bread," the latter being still the principal feature of the meal.[27] And if the Last Supper exercises a possible influence upon this rite, which is referred to variously as a "eucharist," "breaking of bread" and "sacrifice," it is still far from being regarded as the prototype of the rite itself. Nor, even, does Ignatius of Antioch so regard it, but, in speaking likewise of the "eucharist" or "sacrifice of the altar," simply extends the Johannine teaching given to the multitude: the mystic food is itself endowed to be the "medicine of immortality." [28]

When the curtain next rises on the worship of these regions, we are, as R. H. Connolly says, in "an appreciable-sized Church in the same part of Syria" as that for which the Didache was written, and the date is the first half of the third century. The document before us, the comprehensive Didascalia Apostolorum, which is next in the line of the Church Orders and is admittedly influenced by the Didache, contains no adequate description of the eucharist; but its passing allusions suggest a symbolism which is still constructed only on the bread:

[26] Jn. iii.13, vii.34.
[27] ix and x.
[28] ad. Rom. vi and vii; ad Ephes. xx.

"Offer an acceptable eucharist, the likeness (*similitudinem*) of the royal body of Christ . . . pure bread that is made with fire and sanctified with invocations." [29]

"For if the Holy Spirit is in thee, without [just] impediment dost thou keep thyself from . . . the eucharist; . . . (for) whether is (the) greater, the bread, or the Spirit that [sanctifieth the bread. . . .]? [30]

In this second quotation there seems to be an allusion to later difficulties created by teaching such as is found in the Didache — that only the sinless may partake of the heavenly food. But the main points to note are, first, that the symbolism of the unity of Christians through partaking of the one bread has now definitely passed into that of bread offered as a similitude of Christ's body; and secondly, that an epiclesis of the Holy Spirit on the bread would seem to be replacing earlier ideas of its association with an invoked spiritual power or with the "Name" of God.

Of much the same date as the Didascalia is the Anaphora of Hippolytus, already discussed in connection with its Eastern bread-recital. In the third section of the prayer is included also the first definite invocation of "holy Spirit" [31] upon the oblation, to the end that through participation the "saints" may receive the spiritual benefits of union and "confirmation of (their) faith in truth."

Linked with Hippolytus, and our chief witness for developments in West Syria, is Apostolic Constitutions viii. This is the first actual liturgy to adopt an epiclesis of the Holy Spirit that the elements may become the body and blood of Christ, although the word used, *ἀποφήνῃ*, is weak compared with those used in some other liturgies.[32] Apostolic Constitutions is of very great importance as proving that the epiclesis did not arise as a transfer to the elements of the Jewish conception of the *Shekînah*, or divine Presence, among worshippers.[33] This theory, now popular,

[29, 30] Ed. R. H. Connolly, pp. 252f, 244f. See also p. lxxxix of the same work.

[31] G. Dix, op. cit., p. 79, although arguing strongly against the genuineness of this epiclesis, rightly hesitates to exclude it. If it is to be omitted, then Hippolytus merely becomes more strongly Western and his evidence does not affect this section of the present essay. C. C. Richardson confirms my view, HTR. xl.2.

[32] J. H. Srawley, op. cit., p. 77.

[33] Cf. W. O. E. Oesterley, Jewish Background, pp. 224ff for a careful exposition of this view, and contrast Lietzmann, op. cit., pp. 68ff.

cannot be upheld in face of Lietzmann's marshalled evidence that the liturgies of Chrysostom, Basil, James and Mark, which include an invocation of the Holy Spirit upon the worshippers, are all developments from Apostolic Constitutions, whose invocation is upon the elements alone.[34] It is true that this invocation is followed by a prayer for the fruits of a good communion, but this is not the same as an invocation upon the worshippers themselves; it is the ground-work out of which the epiclesis has undoubtedly developed; and it will already have been observed that the ultimate object of all earlier forms of invocation is that benefit may come to the worshippers as they partake of the consecrated food. It need hardly be added that a liturgy so late as Apostolic Constitutions, and with a root in Hippolytus, regards itself as following the command of Jesus at the Last Supper, although its recital of institution is manifestly shaped by Eastern Tradition.

A similar development to that which we have considered in Syria took place in Egypt. First, Clement of Alexandria quotes from Theodotus the gnostic (c.160 A.D.): "The bread is hallowed by the power or the Name of God; remaining the same in appearance . . . it is transformed into spiritual power." [35] The indigenous Egyptian church had strongly gnostic antecedents; but a temporary deviation from its natural type is revealed in the logos-epiclesis of Origen, Athanasius and the later form of the liturgy of Sarapion. The thoughts of Origen, although we must remember the paucity of his eucharistic references, appear to arise in connection with the bread alone: "bread sanctified by the λόγος of God and prayer," whereby it becomes "profitable in virtue"; "loaves" which become "on account of the prayer a certain holy body which sanctifies those who use it aright." [36] It should be added that although Origen knows the words of institution he appears reluctant to cite them,[37] and that the character of his

[34] "Thy Holy Spirit come upon us and make us pure" as a substitute for "Thy kingdom come" in the Lord's Prayer (Greg. Nyss., Maximus, 700 and 162) reflects the Byzantine liturgies. Burkitt and Creed seem to be right, as against Streeter, in holding that this was not the reading of Q.

[35] Excerpta ex Theodoto, lxxxii.

[36] in Matt. xi.14: cf. also c. Cels. viii.33 and in I Cor. vii.5.

[37] Cf. W. H. Frere, The Anaphora, p. 42.

eucharist is not sacrificial but mystical and symbolical and such as is indicated by its name.

In the received form of Sarapion, the logos-epiclesis, whose wording distinctly echoes Origen, seems to be part of various material used in the last half of the fourth century to expand an *ur*-Sarapion.[38] The epiclesis of the latter resembles the earlier thought of Theodotus already quoted, for it is an invocation of the "Lord of Powers" to fill the sacrifice with his "power and participation," — once again in order that the worshippers may have the fruits of a good communion. This invocation is uttered while the elements are being offered (neither before nor after) [39] as a likeness (ὁμοίωμα) [40] of Christ's body and blood. Nothing could show greater independence of the Pauline command to repeat the rite of the Last Supper. Even the recitals of institution which now, inevitably, follow in the received text, although it is unlikely that they were included in the *Urtyp*, have for their object only to explain the sense in which the elements are a "likeness." It may be noted that the bread recital of this liturgy, which comes from a Church in the Nile Delta, includes "broken" against the whole weight of the Alexandrine texts of I Cor. xi.24.

After Athanasius, the friend of Sarapion, who likewise continues Origen's tradition of a logos-epiclesis, the Egyptian Fathers testify to an invocation of the Holy Spirit as himself the Consecrator, and so we reach the fully developed Eastern type.

For the Jerusalem Church we have no evidence before 350 A.D., when the liturgy described in lecture xxiii of the Mystagogic Catecheses of Cyril exhibits an epiclesis for conversion of the most literal type and, at the same time, omits all mention of the words of institution. The latter are of course known to Cyril and he quotes them in his preceding lecture as proving that it is the body and blood of Christ that are received in the divine mysteries, — although his Eastern use of symbol still mingles with a literal

[38] Lietzmann has tried to disengage this *Urtyp* in Messe and Herrenmahl, ch. xi. For a careful criticism see A. D. Nock, JTS xxx, pp. 382ff.

[39] Lietzmann translates προσηνέγκαμεν by "we have offered," but A. D. Nock, op. cit., has pointed out that the aorist is unlikely to carry this precise significance.

[40] Lietzmann's discussion of words like ὁμοίωμα, ἀντίτυπον, σύμβολον is valuable; pp. 190ff.

interpretation; and Lietzmann, as well as more traditional scholars, has concluded that the words of institution must therefore have been included in Cyril's eucharistia. But it is really quite evident that they were not; [41] whilst the verbal affinities of this prayer with the Syriac James and Sarapion are such as to suggest that the words of institution in these latter have been superimposed upon earlier forms of the Antiochene and Egyptian rites. There can be little doubt that it is the Western element in the liturgy of Hippolytus (so often called the "Egyptian Church Order") — mediated by Apostolic Constitutions in the case of James — that has affected the later forms of both. Cyril represents a pure Eastern development, in which the gifts of bread and wine, offered up to God in sacrifice, undergo conversion through the agency of the Holy Spirit. Intercessions, also of advanced type, follow the dread moment of consecration in Cyril's liturgy, and these conclude with one brief phrase — "propitiating God that loveth mankind on their behalf *as well as on our own*" — which reveals their development from the ancient prayer for the benefits of communion. For the rest, however, all reference to the value of communion has disappeared.

No stress is laid here upon the evidence of the various gnostic "Acts." Lietzmann's point is well made, however, when he says that their rites, in which bread or bread and water were the elements, could hardly have arisen had not the essence of the eucharist been thought to lie in the bread. In the most important of them, the Syriac Acts of Judas Thomas (judged to have been composed before the overthrow of the Parthian dynasty in 224 A.D.),[42] the broken bread is blessed and distributed with such words as "Bread of life, thou art he that vouchsafeth to receive a gift, that thou mayest become unto us remission of sins and that they who eat thee may become immortal"; and the invocations which follow, or precede, are such as "Come, holy dove"; "We invoke upon thee the name of (thy) Jesus"; "Let the powers of blessing come, and be established in this bread." [43]

[41] I am glad to find that G. Dix, with whom I am so often in disagreement, here reaches the same conclusion. Cf. The Shape of the Liturgy, pp. 196ff.

[42] Cf. F. C. Burkitt, Early Eastern Christianity, p. 216, and M. R. James, Apocryphal New Testament, pp. 228, 388, 422.

[43] Cf. Lietzmann, op. cit., pp. 243ff, or M. R. James, op. cit., pp. 388, 422.

More important are the many Syriac liturgies, in particular Addai and Mari, the type of which possibly goes back to the late third century. E. C. Ratcliff thinks that originally this eucharistia may have been said over bread alone, and he finds in it affinities to the rite of the Didache. It goes beyond the Didache in looking expressly to the Last Supper, but, although the prayer has been worked over, there is no justification for assuming that it originally included a recital of institution additional to the following: "We . . . have received by tradition the example which is from thee." As in Sarapion, the prayer then speaks of "performing . . . the likeness" (this time, "of the passion, and death and burial and resurrection of our Lord . . ."); and we see a foreshadowing of the typical Eastern recital of institution in the invocation, evidently primitive, of the Holy Spirit of Jesus to bless and hallow the oblation "that it be to us . . . for the pardon of offences and remission of sins and for the great hope of resurrection from the house of the dead and for new life in the kingdom of heaven . . . ." Here again the invocation is part of a prayer for the fruits of communion.[44]

Finally, as evidence for East Syria, we come to Narsai, who says that the bread and wine are to be regarded as likenesses, types or symbols of the body and blood of Christ only before the invocation. Then, "through the brooding and operation of the Holy Spirit," they become his actual glorified body, broken and given to each worshipper as individual manifestations of the Risen Christ, on the analogy of his appearances to his various followers after the Crucifixion.[45]

From the Eastern evidence as a whole, the development of the central part of the anaphora is now perfectly to be seen. Everything arose in connection with the breaking of bread and the utterance which accompanied its offering. As the broken bread took on increased significance, so the invocation expressed that

[44] E. C. Ratcliff argues that the epiclesis in Addai and Mari is out of place; and his suggestion that it may have come originally before the act of communion gives greater weight to the conclusions of this essay. See JTS xxx, pp. 29f. G. Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy, p. 182, would seem to be misled, here as elsewhere, by overworking his theory of Jewish derivations.

[45] Ed. R. H. Connolly, The Liturgical Homilies of Narsai (Texts and Studies, viii, pp. 17ff, 24).

significance more completely, always in relation to the fruits of participation. Then, as development reached its fullness, a significant moment was distinguished in which symbol passed into actuality, so that it became necessary to arrange the prayer in an ordered sequence. In this way, language concerning the symbolism of the elements and the benefits of receiving them came to be put first, in a "recital of institution": "This is my body which is broken for you for remission of sins (and life eternal)." This recital foreshadowed the moment of consummation, when, by the invoked activity of the Holy Spirit, the sacrifice became that which it represented. Out of thoughts of the fruits of communion arose the now added intercessions, as being specially efficacious in the presence of the most dread miracle of consecration. And the fraction [46] could now take place only after consecration, when the true body lay upon the altar. Finally, even communion itself began to disappear in the all-absorbing thought of the offering of a sacrifice. We must add that the second half of the anaphora, in which all these related developments occur, manifestly contains the nucleus out of which the Eastern liturgies have grown. G. Dix, in maintaining that it is the first half of the prayer that contains the original nucleus, is completely misled by his theory that the eucharistia was derived directly from a Jewish *berâkah*. The reaction against Hellenism as a determining influence on primitive Christianity has gone too far, and the balance needs urgently to be redressed.

[46] It cannot be assumed that from the beginning the fraction always took place after the eucharistia, as part of an ordered "fourfold shape" of the liturgy. It would on the one hand be natural not to break the bread until it had been blessed, but a feeling for dramatic symbolism may very easily have caused it to be broken at the mention of this word, and then perhaps again for distribution. There was no rule about it and no special ceremony until full liturgical development had taken place; e.g., Augustine says that the "mystic" eucharistic prayer is offered *while* the elements are blessed and consecrated and broken for distribution" (de Trin. iii.4; Sermo. 227). In some rites the fraction appears in a variety of places, — sure witness to the fact that it had no ancient, uniform position. A useful summary of the facts is to be found in Handbook to the Christian Liturgy, by James Norman, pp. 282 ff; cf. also 107 ff, 120 ff. G. Dix gives no proper account of the variations concerning the fraction. Its omission by Justin he dismisses as just "odd"; nor can I find that he mentions its omission in the usual place in A.C. Liturgists usually assume that it took place during the Deacon's litany after the consecration; it may have done so, or it may not. This omission from A.C. is important, as further witness to the fluidity of the rite from which all Syro-Byzantine liturgies were developed.

3. Final developments in the West concerning the Canon, and in both West and East concerning the sacrifice, can now also be traced. With the assertion of different views of the moment of consecration, Eastern and Western liturgies drew apart. Symbolic material which East and West for long had shared remained permanently embedded in the Western masses, but it was divorced as far as possible from suggestions of consecration by a special invocation. Lietzmann (and others) have suggested that a thorough revision took place in the West at the time of the Gregorian reform, c.600 A.D.; and in perhaps the most valuable part of his book, from the point of view of strictly liturgical studies, Lietzmann shows in detail how all the epiclesis material was apparently reshaped and dispersed throughout the Western masses; he maintains that it reveals its original nature most clearly in the Te igitur and Supplices te rogamus.

In agreement with these changes, the mass now developed primarily as a re-enactment of Christ's sacrificial death; the earlier Eastern ideas of εὐχαριστία, and of the elements as an offering to God of his own bounties, were subordinated. In the East, likewise, sacrificial developments took place, not however through subordinating the offering of the gifts but through concentrating on the sacrifice which they mystically represented. Thus, interest in the later Western and Eastern liturgies centres respectively on two different ideas of sacrifice. Each is quite clearly linked with the bread-recital and view of consecration of its particular type of liturgy and is indeed traceable, in conjunction with these, from a point in the second century. The typical sacrifice of Christians had at first been considered to be prayer, or the spirit of prayer: [47] but with the destruction of the Jewish Temple, and the infiltration of ideas from contemporary pagan mysteries, the Christian Supper rite began to be interpreted as the "pure sacrifice" [48] which the prophets had demanded. And so the Supper was gradually transformed on the two main lines suggested above, from a simple meal in which dispositions of love and fellowship were pre-eminent into

[47] Rom. xiii.1; Heb. xiii.15; Rev. v.8, viii. 3f; I Clem. lii, etc.

[48] E.g., Did. xiv.1; Justin, Trypho, 28, 41, 116; cf. I Apol. lxvi; also Iren., Tert., Clem. Al.

liturgical rites of splendor, mystery and dread. Always it is sacrifice that evokes the elaborate cultus.[49]

The Roman Mass belongs to the ancient type of gift-sacrifice, in which the victim is offered whole to God and its earthly life surrendered; the Eastern eucharist belongs rather to the type of communion-sacrifice, in which the victim is destroyed, even the bones being pounded up, whilst its life is received into the life of the worshipping community.[50] The two conceptions are of course to some extent intermingled — this had happened already in the Jewish sacrificial system — so that the sacrifice is in both cases propitiatory and also for communion; but the former element predominates in the Roman, and the latter in the Eastern, rite; or to put it another way, the one rite is more definitely sacrificial, the other mystical. The Passover festival has its origin in gift-sacrifice, the lamb being a firstling whose bones must not be broken, and we see this conception clearly carried over into the Gospel of Mark, who represents the Last Supper as a Passover meal at which the Paschal victim himself was present to found the Christian Covenant and typify his imminent sealing of it on the Cross, where his blood was outpoured while his body was unbroken. This conception was bequeathed by Mark to the Roman Church which, after the period in which Eastern influences were admitted, firmly embraced it and developed it; and the open symbol of this view was the gradual Roman substitution, accomplished by the eleventh century, of unleavened wafers for the leavened bread of the ancient eucharist.[51] The wafers are not broken for

[49] The earliest elements of synagogue worship were developed from the Temple service and from the custom of sacrificial watches (*Ma'amad*) at the times of sacrifice. The Tannaim (70–c. 220 A.D.) began the systematic ordering of the Jewish liturgy, including one prayer in remembrance of the sacrifice; but nothing is more interesting in the comparative study of religions than the way in which the idea of sacrifice has in the end completely faded from Judaism while it lives on in Christianity as the result of the sacrificial interpretation of Christ's death.

[50] But W. Robertson Smith's theory that gift-sacrifice developed from communion-sacrifice seems no longer tenable. On communion-sacrifice among the ancient Greeks see L. R. Farnell, Greece and Babylon, pp. 232ff. and Hibbert Journal, 1904; also, for further modifications, A. D. Nock, The Cult of Heroes (HTR. xxx.vii.2). It appears that whilst the ancient Romans did not think of a communion with deities in food, the ancient Greeks felt that some measure of blessing attached to food after its consecration in sacrifice. This natural tendency to communion-sacrifice developed under the influence of the mysteries.

[51] See Bingham, Antiquities, xv.2.5 and 3.35. Cardinal Bona's (1609–74) ex-

participation by the communicants, although the host itself on the altar is broken (into three), thereby preserving, as so often in the Roman rite, some relic of primitive practice.[52] In the Eastern rites the use of leavened bread has remained unchanged; and from the sacred loaves, which now replace bread taken from the people's offerings, a central portion called the "Holy Lamb" is divided and, with realistic intent, then "speared" and "stabbed" [53] as a sacrifice in the prothesis. This was done formerly at the altar as the second part of the offertory. "Ever eaten and never consumed," the Lamb of God is slaughtered to become spiritual food through an indwelling of the Spirit.

Two obvious problems demand final brief consideration: How was an early Eastern rite, in which the cup preceded the bread, transformed into one in which the bread preceded the cup? And what is the relation of Mark to I Cor.xi? The first of these problems loses most of the difficulty which some have felt concerning it as soon as it is realized that Eastern rites derive from a primitive type in which bread had the chief importance. Distribution of broken bread was likewise the central feature of Jewish meals, both on ordinary and on solemn occasions; and the East, as we have seen, was at first much more under Jewish influences than the West. Among the Jews, on solemn occasions, a *kiddûsh*-cup was also usually drunk, although its position was not fixed, and was a matter of dispute, during the first two centuries.[54] Thus, although the drinking of the *kiddûsh*-cup at the beginning of the solemn meal is now established in Jewish practice, it must at first

planation of the change of practice as for convenience sake may be dismissed as a piece of rationalisation by a hard-pressed controversialist, especially in view of the general Roman argument that unleavened bread is primitive. Its doctrinal origin is plain, but we do not know how much earlier than the 11th century it may be. Can. 80 of the 2nd Trullan Council (A.D. 692) forbade all representations of Christ under the form of a lamb; and whereas the East continued to regard the sacred loaf as if it figured a lamb, it would be a natural step for the West to substitute Passover for ordinary bread. Cf. note 20.

[52] Cf. also Ordo Romanus I (Migne P. L. lxxviii), in which one of the two loaves offered by the Pope is broken and one part placed on the altar, that it (i.e. the altar) may not be "without sacrifice upon it during the performance of the solemnities of the mass."

[53] Cf. Brightman, Liturgies Eastern and Western, pp. 356 ff. English translation in The Liturgies, J. M. Neale and R. F. Littledale, pp. 179 ff.

[54] Cf. Lietzmann, op. cit., pp. 202 ff.

have been a local custom which influenced Christians living among Jews who had adopted it. Even if the Christian cup-bread rite spread widely, as might be inferred from D and other texts of Luke's account of the Last Supper, the position of the cup in rites of Eastern origin was never of supreme importance; so that when the eucharist ceased to be a meal, and the breaking of bread and the drinking of the cup were made consecutive in a ritual act, the traditional significance of the bread would be emphasized by placing it first. It must further be remembered that the account of the Last Supper in I Cor.xi and in other Gospel sources than the shorter text of Luke necessarily exercised in the East a growing general influence, if not one fully formative as against a deep-rooted Tradition. Thus, the order of bread before cup prevailed.

The second problem is more difficult. We cannot be finally sure that the Marcan account of the Last Supper has not some aetiological motive [55] in respect of a weekly Supper rite such as we are in the habit of assuming, from I Cor.xi, to have existed among Christians from the first. But it is significant that no external evidence can be adduced in support of a rite of this particular type before the time of Justin Martyr. And we have also seen that the one self-evident object of Mark's sacrificial interpretation of the Last Supper is to displace the Passover and to proclaim the Covenant which Christ sealed by his death. This interpretation is evidently as original in Mark as it was influential among later writers, and no one has yet clearly demonstrated that because the command to repeat the Supper was not integral to Mark — and the whole Synoptic tradition follows this Gospel in not recording it — another account must be presupposed in which it was recorded. Such a conclusion depends entirely on our estimate of I Cor.xi. 23–26, and it is by no means certain that this passage does not represent a compromise between Mark's account of the Last Supper and an existing Christian rite which, although it too looked to the last meal of Jesus with his disciples, had been built up on the symbolical significance which the bread and the wine

[55] There is no doubt an aetiological motive in Mark's description of the orderly Feeding of the Multitudes at eventide; and the evidence for a very early *Western* rite in which bread was of chief importance would be extended if, as F. C. Burkitt was the first to suggest, a lost sequel to Mark has provided some of the source-material for the first half of Acts, with its stress on the "Breaking of Bread."

would naturally possess for Christians. For example the bread-recital — "This is my body which is for you" — to consideration of which we must confine ourselves as specially relative to this essay, seems to hesitate between Mark's "This is my body" and the Eastern formula "This is my body which is broken for you"; and the verse was unable to maintain itself against the liturgical needs of both East and West. No liturgy adopted it, and even a large number of New Testament texts inserted "broken," or some cognate word, to explain its meaning. Again, as regards the words "for you": If, in the construction from Mark of the uncertain wine-formula — "This cup is the new Covenant of my blood" — the Marcan words "for many" had been dropped from their connection with the cup, they would be likely to reappear in a different context, as so often happens in liturgical innovations. "For many," in its liturgical form of "for you," may well have been transferred in this way to the bread-formula of I Cor.xi; certainly, without the word "broken," it has none of that power of closeness to the thing signified which is a sign of original inspiration. Its form might however be natural to one who, whilst under a liturgical compulsion to add to Mark's wording, was unwilling to tamper with his theology. In other words, just as Mark could not use the word "broken," so neither could the early liturgist, for the meal is the new Passover and Christ is the Paschal Lamb, "not a bone of whose body might be broken."

Such a hypothesis must, of course, ultimately stand or fall at the bar of critical studies devoted to the investigation of the text of I Corinthians as a whole; and this is a matter far beyond our present scope. The main thesis of this essay is that the bread-recitals and views of consecration and sacrifice which are distinctive of the West and of the East are organically related in each type of liturgy, and that those of the East were developed from a symbolic breaking and offering of bread rather than from any New Testament account of the Last Supper.

DANTE'S HEAVENLY ROSE: AN ANALOGUE OR A BORROWING?

The figure of the rose with which Dante tops the soaring structure of his Paradiso may seem to have stimulated comment enough by now, and the present note, pointing out yet another possible analogue, serve merely to expand the raw bulk of such materials, which, though interesting in themselves, add little essential to our knowledge of the poem. But no *Stoffkritik* has yet explained entirely happily to the student of the popular otherworld traditions, the origin of this figure in the Divine Comedy or the peculiar fitness of its use there. And the present parallel has the virtue that it is really a parallel, and not confined to the rose alone, whose figure and symbolic significance are common property in the Middle Ages. On the contrary, it describes at the supernal heights of heaven a *city* which is shaped like a rose, is also the special paradise of the Virgin, and contains traces of another *motif* — the empty thrones and the waiting crowns and vestments reserved until the Time shall come for the just and the poor in spirit —, which Dante also places for the elect within the limits of this heavenly city. All this, moreover, appears in a work belonging to that body of otherworld lore from which the Divine Comedy, itself the most elaborate literary example of this *genre*, frequently borrows.

The text in which the parallel survives is an Ethiopic version of the Apocalypse of the Virgin, incorporated in a homily ascribed to John the son of Zebedee, and the passage in question is here quoted from the Latin translation of Marius Chaine.[1] The whole gives an account of Mary's visit to Heaven and Hell under the guidance of her Son, during which she witnesses the going-out of a righteous and a wicked soul at death, passes through the Garden and City of the Earthly Paradise, where are the habitations of the meek, crosses the river to the dwellings of the virgins, sees the couches and crowns of the martyrs and the shining houses of the heads of the Church, and is carried up to the Heavenly Jerusalem. At the climax of her journey through the realms of the blessed, the Apocalypse describes how the Lord

fecit me adscendere in regionem illius fluminis et introduxit me in civitatem Domini, et ostendit mihi *civitatem sicut rosa constructam*, cuius nec fines usque ad terminos suos revelatae sunt, nec fundationes cognoscuntur; eius claritas magis quam

[1] Apocrypha de B. Maria virgine, in Scriptores aethiopici, ser. 1, tom. VII (Corpus script. christ. orient., Rome, 1909), item iii: Apocalypsis seu visio Mariae virginis, text, pp. 53–80; transl. pp. 45–68. Cf. Sir E. A. Wallis Budge, Legends of our lady Mary the perpetual virgin and her mother Hannâ (London, etc.: the Medici Society, 1922), pp. 245–78.

sol septuplo resplendescebat, *et in ea congregabantur vestimenta aurea et argentea et monilia aurea cum coronis aureis.* Et interrogavi filium meum et dixi illi: 'Quorum est ista mansio?' Respondit et dixit mihi: 'Eorum est qui spreverunt contempserunt-que hoc saeculum praeteriens, *monachorum* qui reliquerunt omnes divitias et voluptates; nemo hanc regionem et mansionem cognoscit, nec angeli nec archangeli neque sacerdotes in eam intrabunt, sed ad portas tantum incensum offerent. Nemo intravit in eam nisi ego et Pater et Paracletus; *tu vero ingredere, consede interius; sit tibi civitas tua*; et quadraginta angeli tibi servient.[2]

The relevance of this material to Dante is clear enough, but what is the nature of their actual relationship? Is the Ethiopic an accidental parallel, the clue to an apocryphal tradition which was accessible also to the author of the Divine Comedy, or — to suggest that the stream may have run the other way — an Ethiopian borrowing from the Comedy itself, whether direct or indirect? These questions are particularly tantalizing because, while the parallel is so unmistakable, the evidence on which an answer must be based is at present unsatisfactory.

With respect to the last possibility suggested — that it is the Ethiopic which is the borrower —, it should be observed that none of the extant manuscripts of the Apocalypse is older than the seventeenth century [3] and that there is evidence elsewhere of Italian influence in Ethiopia from the fifteenth century onward, especially in the field of religious art and ideas, following the sojourn there of the Venetian painter Niccolò Brancaleone.[4]

This possibility is further enhanced, moreover, by the unique character of the Ethiopic book among the examples of the Apocalypse of the Virgin traditionally associated with the Transitus, or Dormitio, Mariae and surviving still in Greek, Syriac, and Arabic.[5] Not all the forms of the Transitus contain the apocalyptic section (for example, the Armenian and the two abbreviated Latin versions [6]), though there is every

[2] Transl. Chaine, p. 60. I have italicized the details which are particularly important for the present discussion. Cf. Budge, pp. 265–6.

[3] See the introduction to Chaine's text, p. 52.

[4] Budge, p. xliv, and F. Alvarez, Narrative of the Portuguese embassy to Abyssinia, transl. Lord Stanley (London, 1881), p. 210.

[5] For the Greek see especially Tischendorf, Apocalypses apocryphae (Leipzig, 1866), pp. 95–112; A. Vassiliev, Anecdota graeco-byzantina, I (Moscow, 1893), 125 ff.; and M. R. James, Apocrypha anecdota I (Texts and studies, ed. J. Armitage Robinson, II. 3 [1893]), pp. 115–26, and Apocr. anec. II (Texts and studies, V. 1 [1897]), p. 141. For the Syriac, A. S. Lewis, Apocrypha syriaca (Studia sinaitica, no. XI [1902]), esp. pp. 64–9; cf. W. Wright, in Journal of sacred literature, n. s., VII (1865), 156–8. For the Arabic, Maximilian Enger, Ioannis apostoli de transitu beatae Mariae virginis liber (Elberfeld, 1854). See also M. R. James, The apocryphal New Testament (Oxford, 1924), pp. 194 ff., esp. p. 222, and pp. 563–4.

[6] Paul Vetter, "Die armenische *dormitio Mariae*," Theologische Quartalschrift, LXXXIV (1902), 321–49; and (for the Latin) Tischendorf, Apoc. apocr., "Tran-

indication that it may have appeared originally even so; for its wide occurrence otherwise shows that it became a regular feature of this literature, and the Syriac proves that the association was fairly old, since Agnes Smith Lewis found it occurring in a palimpsest of the late fifth or early sixth century.[7] However, none of the apocalypses in these various versions of the Transitus, among the texts so far discovered, contains any trace of the Rose City as it appears in the Ethiopic. In them regularly the climax of the journey to the realms of the righteous is the visit to the Heavenly Jerusalem, where Mary is received by her Son. Later, after viewing the torments of the wicked, she is conducted down to the City of the Earthly Paradise, where she had earlier been — a stage, as it were, on her return to earth, but with the implication that this city is to be her abode after death. At least, here is where she does appear after death in such another early work as the "Apocalypse of St. Paul," [8] whose origin is probably to be found as far back as the third century.[9]

Now in these same versions of the Transitus, just before her return to the Earthly Paradise and while she is still in the Heavenly Jerusalem, Mary witnesses "the two worlds, this one that passeth away, and that one which passeth not away. And she saw too, in a place in that world which passeth not away, many lights shining very brightly, and mansions without number. . . . And she saw the tabernacles. My Lady Mary said to the Messiah, 'My Lord Rabbūlī, what are these?' The Messiah said to my Lady Mary, 'These are the tabernacles of the just, and these lights are shining in their honor, and from a distance they behold their happiness, until the day of the resurrection, when they

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situs Mariae A," pp. 113–23; "Transitus Mariae B," pp. 124–36. See also the Syriac text in W. Wright, Contributions to the apocryphal literature of the New Testament (London, 1865), pp. 24 ff., and the Coptic texts in James, Apocr. N.T., pp. 194–201. For more recently published texts see André Wilmart, Analecta reginensia, Studi e testi, no. LIX (Città del Vaticano, 1933), pp. 325–57, and 357–62, which prints two further Latin versions (C and D); and the Byzantine texts and studies by M. Jugie: Patrologia orientalis, XVI (1922), 425–589, and XIX (1926), 285–526; "La mort et l'assomption de la Sainte Vierge dans la tradition des cinq premiers siècles," Echos d'orient, XXV (1926), 5–20, 129–43, 281–307; and "La littérature apocryphe sur la mort et l'assomption de Marie," Echos d'orient, XXIX (1930), 264–95. Cf. Rudolph Willard, "On Blickling homily XIII: the Assumption of the Virgin," Review of English studies, XII (1936), 1 ff., and "The testament of Mary," Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, IX (1937), 341–64.

[7] Apocrypha syriaca, "Introduction," p. x.

[8] In the Long texts in Greek, Latin, Coptic, Syriac, and Old Slavonic; see Silverstein, Visio sancti Pauli (London, 1935), p. 32, and the texts referred to there; and James, Apocr. N.T., pp. 549–50.

[9] Silverstein, p. 3 and p. 91, n. 2; and R. P. Casey, "The Apocalypse of Paul," Journal of Theological Studies, XXXIV (1933), esp. 28 and 24–6.

shall inherit their mansions.' " [10] All this disappears from the Ethiopic text, as does the return to the Earthly Paradise itself. In their place, climaxing even the experience of the Heavenly Jerusalem, is put the passage describing the Rose City, which is to be the Virgin's own, together with the description of the crowns and vestments, which parallels, yet substitutes for, the more usual account of the "tabernacles of the just." The whole procedure is testimony to the preoccupation of the Ethiopic author or his source with the veneration of the Virgin in its most extreme form.

But it is testimony also that the passage may be merely a late addition, unsupported by precursors of genuine antiquity. Taken together with the known Italian influence in Ethiopia, it suggests that we may indeed have here a trace of contact with an essentially Dantesque tradition.

On the other hand, there are some small circumstances that seem to point to an opposite conclusion: that the Ethiopic is a clue to a wider spread and older body of lore, the analogue, in short, of material that may have been available to Dante independently. But this evidence is indirect and must be derived from other features of the Ethiopic book in relation to their sources and parallels, especially from the details of the *motif* of the empty thrones and waiting crowns and vestments, which, as we have seen, is connected with the Rose City in both the Divine Comedy and our apocalypse.

The Ethiopic text as a whole is not a new production of undiscovered provenience, but probably a derivative, by way of the Arabic, of older works originating among the Copts, whose Christianity had produced a flourishing corpus of Mary legends.[11] Coptic writings of this sort typically enrich their sources with imaginative interpolation, but also sometimes preserve very old features that have disappeared or been drastically abbreviated in apocryphal works circulating in other languages. The Ethiopic Apocalypse of the Virgin, when examined carefully, discloses just these qualities of a Coptic text. Its account of the otherworld journey, attributed to John son of Zebedee as in the non-

[10] "The departure of my lady Mary," transl. from Syriac by Wright, Journal of Sacred Lit., n. s., VII, 158. Cf. A. S. Lewis, Apocrypha siriaca, p. 66, where the *motif*, though abbreviated, clearly appears; and Ioannis apost. de transitu (Arabic), ed. Enger, pp. 93–4.

[11] For the early development of the Transitus literature in Africa see James, Apocr. N.T., p. 194, and Budge, "Introduction," passim, and p. lxxv. Chaine, text, p. 51, and transl., p. 43, thinks that the Ethiopic comes through Arabic from the Greek, but this is a general reference to the supposed origin of this literature as a whole, and is based on the doubtful view of Tischendorf.

Ethiopic versions, also parallels basically their narrative, with its strong reminiscences of the Book of Enoch (Ethiopic) and the Ascension of Isaiah. But into it has been introduced a number of details from the "Apocalypse of St. Paul" — so extraordinary a number, in fact, as to give the Ethiopic Apocalypse of the Virgin almost the character of a variant recension in some respects of that older book.[12] Moreover, in one notable instance at least — the account of the torment of the Laodiceans in Hell —, by placing these sinners *beside* the fiery stream rather than in its depths, it seems to preserve uncontaminated the original state of a theme which it derived directly from "Paul," but from a primitive form of that work, since the textual tradition of "Paul" had already become confused at this point well before the sixth century.[13]

A further sign of this faithfulness to tradition appears also in the passage on the Rose City itself, in the treatment, clear though fragmentary, of the thrones and crowns *motif*. Of the various uses of this theme in apocryphal lore two are particularly relevant here. The first is illustrated in the Ascension of Isaiah, where thrones, crowns, and garments are intended for believers and are set among the general company of the *justi*.[14] It is this form, as we have observed, which the shining tabernacles represent in the non-Ethiopic versions of the Transitus. The second is found in the Long texts of "Paul," where the connection with believers is turned into a particular commendation of God's foolish, the meek and poor in spirit:

'Hii sunt throni eorum qui bonitatem et innocentiam habent et intellectum cordis, qui semetipsos stultos fecerunt propter deum, nescientes scripturas multas neque psalmos plures, sed unius capituli memores de preceptis dei, et audientes hec operati sunt in his in minuta diligentia, et studium rectum habentes coram dominum.'[15]

This second use appears also in a further specialization by which the poor in spirit became identified with monks (this is even implied in "Paul" itself, since that book was originally addressed to a monkish audience) and afterwards with the friars, its latest popular transformation being that associated with the Franciscan movement.[16] In the sub-

[12] Silverstein, pp. 92–3, n. 6; and Casey, Journ. Theol. Stud., XXXIV, 4. See also James, Texts and Studies, II. 3, pp. 115–26, and Apocr. N.T., pp. 563–4.

[13] Silverstein, pp. 29–30.

[14] Ed. R. H. Charles (London, 1900), where the pertinent passages survive in a Western tradition in one of the two extant Latin texts (L^2): pp. 109, 117 f., 120, 122, 123 f., 138.

[15] Silverstein, pp. 140–1. Cf. "The throne of the Emperor Henry in Dante's Paradise and the medieval conception of Christian kingship," Harvard Theological Review, XXXII (1939), 115 ff.

[16] See Harvard Theological Review, XXXII, 116–7, and notes.

lime artistic synthesis of the Paradiso both developments (and many others) are reflected, the *justi* among the destined company of the Virgin being represented, as it were, by the symbol of just and merciful Christian secular authority — the Emperor Henry, and the meek and poor in spirit by St. Francis. But in the Ethiopic book the theme appears in simpler form; there the good and pious for whom the crowns and vestments are being reserved are, as with other, earlier works than the Divine Comedy, specifically called monks. If the author did not find the Rose City in his immediate source, but borrowed it from some Dantéesque topography, it is notable that his handling of one of its elements should have a quality reminiscent of one of the more primitive traditions, before they had been developed by the Italian writer, in composition with other themes, to a new poetic profundity. But perhaps those who wish to see in the Ethiopic text the influence of the Divine Comedy, however indirect, will argue that whatever pictorial representations of Heaven reached Africa through Niccolò Brancaleone would, with all the depth of their spiritual perspective, inevitably have suffered simplification at the hands of an Ethiopic author formed by a native tradition of monkish illustration and pious legend.

No secure conclusions, therefore, can be drawn in the present state of our knowledge as to the actual relationship of Italian poem and Ethiopic homily, beyond observing the striking similarity of their treatment of an unusual theme common to both. Further certainty must wait upon the discovery of some new facts. The balance at the moment is perhaps in favor of the Ethiopian's debt, but indicative that it is Dante who is the borrower would be the uncovering somewhere, among the as yet unedited examples of the Transitus lore or of a related body of legend, of a special heavenly city devoted to the Virgin.

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